

Family Descent as a Signal of Managerial Quality: Evidence from Mutual Funds

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Abstract

We study the relation between fund managers' family backgrounds and their professional performance. Using hand-collected data from individual Census records on the wealth and income of managers' parents, we find that managers from poor families deliver higher alphas than managers from rich families. We argue that managers born poor face higher entry barriers into asset management, and only the most skilled succeed. Consistent with this view, managers born rich are more likely to be promoted, while those born poor are promoted only if they outperform. In the analysis of managerial activity, we find that managers from poor backgrounds do not have higher turnover or active share, yet their activity is more performance-enhancing. Overall, we establish the first link between family descent of investment professionals and their ability to create value.

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Introduction

In the majority of financial decisions, shareholders delegate decision rights to professional managers. Thus, one of the most important tasks of shareholders is to select the most capable, high-type managers as their agents. Inferring managerial type *ex-ante* is challenging. For example, the majority of CEOs at S&P1500 firms have no prior experience in this leadership role. Yet, given the frictions and costs of replacing managers, this task is of first-order importance for economic outcomes in all public firms.

This paper provides evidence that public information about a manager's family descent and access to resources during his formative years serves as a powerful signal of managerial ability. We exploit the fact that individuals are endowed with different opportunities at birth and, as a result, face dramatically different entry barriers into managerial roles. For example, some can ascend to leadership roles with the help of their inherited status, wealth, or access to professional networks, as in the extreme case of the heirs of family-owned firms. Others are born in poverty and face limited access to education and professional advancement during their formative years, a crucial period for subsequent career outcomes (e.g., Black et al. (2005)). Because individuals from less privileged backgrounds have much higher barriers to entry into prestigious positions, only the most skilled types can exceed these high thresholds and build a career in a management profession.

Delegated asset management provides a convenient setting to test this mechanism. First, because this is a service industry driven by human capital, barriers to entry are particularly high. Second, in contrast to industrial firms where daily decisions are made by dozens of managers and implemented by thousands of employees, managers of solo-managed mutual funds have the principal authority over the fund's portfolio. Third, fund managers perform standardized professional tasks within a well-defined investment universe, and their outcomes are easily comparable in the time-series and cross-section. In contrast, many corporate decisions are not standardized, and the investment opportunity set is unobservable. Finally, mutual funds hold over a half of households' financial wealth, and the performance of money managers has a major impact on the majority of U.S. investors, indicating a question of broad public interest.

In this paper, we study the relation between mutual fund managers' family descent and their performance. To identify managers' family characteristics, we hand-collect data on the households where managers grew up by examining photo images of individual Census records at the National Archives. These records provide detailed information on the income, home value, education, and occupation of a manager's parents during his/her childhood, as well as other demographic characteristics. As expected, most fund managers come from wealthier and more educated families than those in the general population or even local community. E.g., the median 1940 annual income of managers' fathers was \$2,045 (compared to the median men's income in the U.S. of \$956) and the median father had 12 years of education (28% more than the median adult education in the census tract in which the household resided). For about 20% of managers at least one of the parents was employed in a finance-related occupation. The average value of the parents' home in our sample is about 15% higher than the median home in the tract and the contract rent is 47% higher than the median rent in the tract. Consistent with the idea that family economic status is an important factor for an individual's subsequent career progression, we observe that managers from wealthier backgrounds were more likely to attend private and more exclusive universities (with lower admission rate and higher tuition) and were more likely to be employed by larger asset management firms in the first three years of their career.

Our main finding is that mutual fund managers from poorer backgrounds deliver significantly higher four-factor alpha than managers that come from wealthy families. For example, managers from families in the bottom decile of parents' income outperform managers in the top decile by 3.71% per year (to compare, the average annual alpha in our sample is -0.47%). Similar result holds when we use household rent or home value as proxies for the manager's at-birth economic status. Our findings survive a comprehensive set of controls which proxy for the quality and type of the manager's own education, his/her demographics, parents' education and professional expertise, and fund and management firm characteristics. In addition, plausible unobservable omitted variables, such as connections and access to information, favor a positive relationship between family status and performance and are unlikely to explain our results. Overall, our evidence is consistent with the view that candidates endowed with fewer opportunities face higher selection thresholds, and only the most skilled make it into fund management.

In further support of this view, we investigate fund managers' career progressions and study how a manager's likelihood of promotion varies with his family background and past performance. We define a promotion as an event when a manager obtains an additional fund or is likely reassigned to a fund with greater assets under management. For managers with neutral past performance (zero past five-year alpha), parents' wealth significantly affects promotion chances: an increase in parents' wealth of \$1,000 (close to the interquartile range) increases the manager's promotion probability by a factor of 1.76. However, managers from poorer families can close this gap by delivering better performance (completely eliminating this gap is difficult: according to our estimates, a manager from the 25th percentile of parents' income has to earn as much as 12% per year to stand the same chance of promotion as a manager from the 75th percentile). This evidence strongly supports our hypothesis that managers born poor can only pass the selection hurdle if they reveal their strong skill, thus ensuring the selection of the most talented managers among the less privileged candidates.

Next, we explore two non-mutually exclusive channels that may contribute to the performance differentials between managers from poor and rich backgrounds: (i) effort and (ii) ability. The *effort channel* posits that managers endowed with few resources at birth are more active on their job. For example, if managers derive diminishing marginal utility from wealth, the same monetary compensation will provide stronger performance incentives for managers with smaller endowed wealth. The *ability channel* posits that managers who are able to enter asset management from the less privileged backgrounds have higher ability. In other words, because individuals born poor face higher barriers in access to education and professional advancement, only the highest-ability individuals pass the selection hurdle.

Our evidence is more consistent with the ability channel. Using a variety of proxies for managerial activity, such as portfolio turnover, active share, measures of herding, and holding horizon, we do not find reliable evidence that managers from poor backgrounds are more active on their jobs. Instead, our results indicate that their alpha is more sensitive to portfolio activity, suggesting that these managers perform activities which are value-improving (rather than simply greater in magnitude), as predicted by the ability channel.

The central contribution of this article is to provide the first evidence on how the family descent of investment professionals signals their ability to create value. Our findings add novel insights to academic research on (i) managerial characteristics that predict professional performance and (ii) the effect of formative years on individuals' career progression and economic outcomes.

We contribute to a small number of papers in asset management that identify personal characteristics of fund managers that predict their professional performance. So far, this literature has focused mostly on the role of managers' education. Chevalier and Ellison (1999) find that mutual fund managers who attended colleges with higher average SAT scores deliver superior risk-adjusted returns, and Li, Zhang, and Zhao (2011) find similar evidence in the context of hedge funds. Cohen, Frazzini and Malloy (2008) show that fund managers' educational networks yield valuable information that improves managerial performance in connected stocks. Chaudhuri, Ivkovich, Pollet, and Trzcinka (2015) provide evidence that investment funds managed by PhD graduates deliver superior risk-adjusted performance and charge lower fees. In contrast to previous work, we document how endowed low economic status serves as an important screening mechanism of managerial ability. Our paper is among the first in the mutual fund literature to emphasize signaling of managerial quality based on selection.

We also extend the literature on the effect of individuals' family environment on subsequent economic outcomes. So far, this research has focused mostly on the economic behavior of individual households. For example, using data from a field experiment, Chetty et al. (2011) find that a child's access to education predicts college attendance, earnings, and retirement savings. In two studies of Swedish twins, the socioeconomic status of an individual's parents helps explain future savings behavior (Cronqvist and Siegel (2015)) and preference for value vs. growth stocks (Cronqvist, Siegel, and Yu (2015)). In contrast to studying households' personal decisions, we provide evidence on sophisticated financial intermediaries whose professional choices have large welfare implications for millions of outside investors. Also, to identify exposure to a socioeconomic environment, prior papers have used general time-series patterns, such as growing up during the Great Depression (Malmendier and Nagel (2011)) or entering the labor market in a recession (Schoar and Zuo (2013)). Our approach uses a sharper

identification by focusing on the unique economic status of each household and uncovers important cross-sectional patterns.

II. Data and main variables

II.A Sample construction

We begin our sample construction with the universe of U.S.-domiciled mutual funds covered by Morningstar and available from Morningstar Direct at the end of 2012. We include defunct as well as active investment products (fund share classes), ensuring that any fund ever appearing in the Morningstar database is present in our initial sample. Next, we restrict our attention to equity-focused actively managed funds by dropping index funds, funds whose U.S. Broad Asset Class is not "U.S. Stock", funds for which Morningstar equity style classification (Equity Style Box) is not available, and funds that have sector restrictions or specialty focus (Global Category includes word "Sector" or Prospectus Objective includes word "Specialty"). Finally, we exclude funds whose total net assets under management (TNA) never exceeded \$10 million and funds that were always managed by more than one manager (i.e. team-managed funds).

For each fund that passes the filters we obtain its historical management data from Morningstar, which details the name of the manager and his/her starting and ending date in a fund with up to one month accuracy. We eliminate managers who have fewer than 24 non-missing monthly return observations (this filter automatically disqualifies managers who first appear in the sample in 2011 or later). For each of the remaining managers we initiate the data collection process described below.

First, we obtain brief biographical descriptions of the managers' careers from Morningstar Principia and Factset. These biographies outline managers' employment histories and sometimes provide details on their educational backgrounds, such as attended universities, degrees earned, and years of

graduation. To enrich these biographical data, we search for managers' public profiles on LinkedIn and CFA Directory and fill the missing education data where possible.

Second, we attempt to locate the manager in Lexis Public Records - the most detailed source of personal information available to researchers without legal restrictions. Lexis database has been used in a number of notable financial studies on corporate executives, including Cronqvist, Makhija, and Yonker (2012) and Yermack (2014). When searching Lexis, we only focus on individuals for whom an unambiguous record exists. This generally implies that the Lexis record has to contain the exact same first and last name as the manager in Morningstar, have the same middle initial, and give the same state for the person's Social Security Number as the state where the manager grew up.² We also condition on the person's age and exclude records where the birth year in Lexis and the university undergraduate degree date are more than 30 years apart. Lexis is an important data source for our study for two reasons: i) it provides a list of addresses where the manager lived or at least received official correspondence, and ii) in the majority of cases, it gives the names of the manager's parents, their home address, and the history of real estate sales and purchases. This information will allow us to locate the manager's parents in the 1940 Census records with high degree of accuracy.

Next, we focus on the Census 1940 filings and look either for the manager himself, if he/she was born before 1940, or his/her parents. Our two primary resources are www.archives.com and www.ancestry.com. At this stage, we are only interested in parents that either had already given birth to the manager by 1940 or would do so within the next 10 years. The underlying motivation for this filter is that we aim to capture the family's social situation during the years of the manager's childhood, and allowing for more than a 10-year difference between the time the data is recorded and the manager's birth would add noise to the measurement. In addition, it is technically difficult to find the right ancestry for younger managers because their parents might not have been married as of 1940 and the household might

² According to SSA, since 1944 more than half of the SSNs were issued to people under the age of 20.

not have been formed. We again require a strict match between the parents' names in Lexis and Census (however, we incorporate the mother's maiden name in the search) and the locations of the household.

This procedure yields 162 unique managers who are considerably older than an average manager in the original Morningstar sample and for whom a long history of observations is available. Generally, at different stages of the data collection process we emphasize data accuracy over the sample size. One reason is that poor measurement can lead to incorrect conclusions, while a smaller sample, if anything, would bias us against finding significant results but can still reveal the general pattern of economic effects. The second reason is that this project studies backgrounds and careers of specific individuals (their names and records are available from the authors) and we take special care not to contaminate our findings with inaccurate personal data.

The following fields from the Census files are of particular interest: the father's and the mother's birth years, their annual incomes, their occupation/profession, whether the family owned or rented an accommodation in 1940, the monthly rent (if the accommodation was rented) or the approximate house value (if it was owned)³, the parents' employment type (a private or a government worker, an employer, a self-employed individual, or an unpaid worker), the parents' education (completed years of elementary school, high school, and college), and some auxiliary information, such as the number of children in the household and the number of resident servants.

In addition to the individual Census records, we also collect census tract-level data where possible. Each individual record reports an enumeration district that for large municipalities can be matched to a census tract - the smallest aggregated demographic unit in the U.S. whose population is relatively homogenous along the dimension of income and wealth.⁴ We obtain the tract-level data for the 1940 Census from the Elizabeth Mullen Bogue File, which featured in several social and history studies

³ Home value is recorded at increments of \$500.

⁴ The matching was conducted via the Unified Census ED Finder engine available at www.stevemorse.org/census/unified.html.

(e.g., Sugrue (1995), Elliott and Frickel (2013))⁵. Important tract-level variables include: total population in the tract (both males and females), median home value, median monthly rent (both gross and contract), the number of residents with school and college education, median education years, and the number of residents without paid employment.

We complete our sample construction by collecting data on the managers' educational institutions, degrees, and specialization. While Morningstar and Nelson biographies or public profiles typically mention the manager's university, other educational characteristics are not publicly available. Therefore, in order to obtain or verify information on the manager's degree type and field of study, we contact the universities' registrar offices and, if necessary, the National Student Clearinghouse, a degree-verification service provider. Furthermore, we collect institution-level data that proxies for the quality of the educational institution as well as the competitiveness, affordability, and status of the program. This information is obtained from the College Handbook, published by the College Entrance Examination Board. There are three versions of this handbook which cover entry classes of 1979, 2004, and 2012. Our variables are mostly based on the 1979 handbook (the closest to the managers' college years) except for the standardized scores, which are available as of 2004.⁶ Some of the university characteristics of interest include the university SAT rank among all U.S. institutions, the university median ACT score, the university size as measured by the undergraduate enrolment, the average tuition for an undergraduate program, the undergraduate admission rate, and the university's affiliation with the Ivy League.

⁵ This data can be found, among other sources, at www.icpsr.umich.edu/icpsrweb/DSDR/studies/2930 and is available for researchers from ICPSR member institutions. The digital copy of the dataset was created by Dr. Donald Bogue and his wife, Elizabeth Mullen Bogue, who manually entered information from printed publications released by the Bureau of the Census.

⁶ Our results are virtually identical if we use the 2004 handbook throughout - there is a high correlation between the 1979 and the 2004 variables.

II.B Summary statistics

We report summary and sample composition statistics for our funds and managers in Table 1. The average (median) manager in our sample is born in 1937 (1939) - three years (one year) before we measure the household characteristics. Even for managers born before (10th percentile is 1929) and after (90th percentile is 1944) 1940, the Census records are close enough in time to accurately reflect the manager's family's social situation during his/her childhood years. The average (median) managerial career, as measured by the time difference between the manager's first and last appearance in the sample, is 14.6 (11.6) years, although some managers have long careers approaching 30 years (90th percentile is 27.9 years). The peak dollar value of assets controlled by the manager has an average value of \$4.7 billion and a median value of only \$694 million, highlighting the fact that a number of managers are in charge of particularly big funds. Both figures are economically large though and imply significant value effects for the funds' investors. Most managers have strong educational backgrounds and graduate from universities with an average (median) SAT rank of 85.6 (91.5). However, the average and the median admission rate is only 52.4%, while the variable itself has a fairly even and wide distribution (from 10th percentile of 20.7% to 90th percentile of 85.7%), suggesting some variation in the education exclusivity.

The estimated average (median) value of the manager's parents' home in 1940 is \$9,256 (\$7,500) but its variation is substantial (from 10th percentile of \$3,000 to 90th percentile of \$20,000). Monthly rent shows a similar pattern: an average (median) rent is \$49.4 (\$40) but the 10th and 90th percentiles are wide apart (\$15 and \$83, respectively). An inspection of the parents' incomes reveals that over 75% of mothers are either unemployed or report an income of \$0 (as evidenced by the occupation records, many of the wives are either housewives or attend school, while most husbands hold at least a part-time job), whereas fathers report an average (median) annual income of \$2,300.8 (\$2,045.0). Finally, for both

parents, the mean and the median years of education at the time of the census is approximately 12, with most of the respondents having completed at least the elementary school (10th percentile is 8 years).⁷

Comparing household-level home values and rent to their tract-level counterparts does not reveal a striking difference for the mean or the median. Household homes are generally more expensive than those of the tract (median \$7,500 vs median \$5,098) but the rent is similar. This pattern suggests that managers whose parents already owned a house in their youth come from wealthier backgrounds while those whose parents rented an accommodation are more representative of the tract's average. Naturally, measures of variation, such as the standard deviation or the percentile range, are significantly lower at the tract level than the household level due to diversification.

Statistics from the fund sample confirm the disparity between the mean and the median size of managed funds (\$1.04 billion vs \$143 million). A similar pattern is observed at the fund family level and is also confirmed by the statistics on the number of equity positions in a fund (mean of 84.2 vs median of 57.0). An average (median) monthly fund return is positive at 0.98% (1.26%); however one must remember that the stock market grew at an unprecedented rate during our sample period between 1960 and 2012. An examination of fund alphas - fund returns in excess of the returns predicted by the four-factor model (Section III describes the computation methodology in greater detail) - reveals that an average (median) monthly alpha in our sample is actually slightly negative: -0.04% and -0.03%, respectively.

Panel B of Table 1 reports some sample composition statistics. The percentage of the observations in a given category is computed relative to the number of non-missing observations for that particular characteristic, e.g., employment type or degree type. 66% of the managers earned some graduate degree at some stage in their life; in particular 56.2% earned an MBA degree, while 2.2% completed a PhD. 93.1% of the managers have either an undergraduate or a graduate degree in a field

⁷ Individual Census records report years in the elementary school, high school, and college separately, while the tract-level Census data report the total years of education, assuming 8 (4) years for the elementary school (high school). We follow the latter convention in constructing our measure of the duration of education.

which we classify as finance-related (see Appendix 2 for the classification methodology), 8.0% hold a degree in a technical discipline, such as physics, statistics or mathematics, and 1% completed a psychology major. Among the other sample composition statistics, we should mention that the vast majority of the managers' parents' were employed in the private sector in 1940 and 20% had a finance-related job, such as an accountant or an insurance advisor. Rather expectedly, most of the funds in our sample (66.5%) belong to the Large Cap styles with the Large Growth being the dominant category (32.3%).

In Table 2 we examine relationships among our main variables in a correlation table. In Panel A we focus on the parents and include household wealth and education characteristics as well as tract wealth characteristics. Using the data from the Census personal records, we define the following major variables: *FatherIncome* is the reported annual income of the manager's father in thousands of dollars; *ParIncome* is equal to the average of the father's and the mother's incomes if the mother's income is not missing, and is equal to the father's income otherwise; *FatherYearsEdu* is the aggregate years of education of the father by the time of the census; *ParYearsEdu* is equal to the average of the father's and the mother's education years if the latter is not missing, and is equal to the father's education years otherwise⁸; *FinanceRelated* is a dummy variable equal to 1 if at least one of the parents held a job that we classify as finance-related, and 0 otherwise; *Managerial* is a dummy variable equal to 1 if at least one of the parents held a job that we classify as being in a managerial position, and 0 otherwise (Appendix 2 gives the details for the classification procedure); *Rent* is the monthly rent in dollars; and *HomeValue* is the self-reported value of the parents' home, if owned, in thousands of dollars.

Both home value and rent are positively related to both the father's income and the average parents' income. The correlation of income with rent (0.581) is stronger than with home value (0.124), suggesting that home value might be a noisier measure of the family's current financial well-being. We

⁸ In some of the Census entries, the mother's characteristics are missing whereas the father's are usually present. In those cases where we cannot verify that the mother had zero income or no education, we treat these data as missing and populate the parent-level variable with the father's data.

cannot correlate home value with rent directly since these variables are available for complementary subsamples, namely, for rented and owned properties. The number of resident servants is positively correlated with all three measures of wealth but is mostly tightly related to rent (0.473). Both the father's and the average parents' education are strongly positively related to income and rent, with all the correlation coefficients exceeding 0.4. Household income, rent, and home value are all higher if at least one of the parents has a finance-related or a managerial job, e.g., the correlation between dummy *FinanceRelated* and *FatherIncome* is 0.453. Larger families, as proxied by the number of siblings, tend to earn smaller incomes but pay higher rents, likely because they occupy more spacious properties. At the tract level, the median rent measures and the median home values are strongly positively correlated. At the same time, tract-level variables are positively related to their respective household counterparts and are also positively related to the measures of household income, e.g., median contract rent has a correlation of 0.164 with the parents' income.

In Panel B, we examine the relationship between the parents' wealth/education and the attributes of the manager's education. For most of the variables featuring in this panel, the variable name directly defines the measure, e.g., variables *HasGraduate*, *HasMBA*, and *HasPhD* are dummies taking the value of 1 if the manager holds any graduate degree, an MBA degree, or a PhD, respectively, and 0 otherwise, while *IvyLeague* is a dummy which takes the value of 1 if the manager's undergraduate institution belongs to the Ivy League, and 0 otherwise. In addition, we define several classification variables to characterize the type of the manager's scholarly specialization, creating dummies for a finance-related field, technical field, and a psychology field (see Appendix 2 for details).

After inspecting the results in Panel B, we first note a strong positive relationship between the parents' wealth and the quality or exclusivity of the manager's university. E.g., parents' income has a correlation of 0.392 with tuition, 0.287 with the Ivy League dummy, 0.321 with the median university ACT score, and -0.303 with the admission rate (correlations among the university variables have the expected signs and do not warrant special attention). Second, graduate education in general was more

often pursued by managers from poorer backgrounds, while the pattern for the MBA degree is inconclusive. Third, financial education appears to be weakly positively related to the parents' income (correlation 0.188) while technical education is weakly negatively related (correlation -0.198). Finally, the manager's own education quality is consistently positively related to his/her parents' education, e.g., there is a 0.270 correlation of the parents' education years with the Ivy League dummy and a 0.324 correlation of the parents' education with the manager's university SAT rank. Also, the manager was somewhat more likely to pursue a finance-related education if at least one of his/her parents was occupied in a finance-related profession (correlation of 0.116). Perhaps surprisingly, the probability of attaining an MBA degree is lower for managers whose parents held a finance-related or a managerial position.

III. Household wealth and managers' performance

In our main set of tests we investigate how fund managers' ability to create value for fund investors relates to their familial backgrounds. The left-hand side of our regressions feature abnormal fund returns, or rolling alphas. For each fund j and month t we estimate the coefficients in the four-factor model, which includes the three Fama-French factors (Fama and French (1993)) and the Carhart momentum factor (Carhart (1997))⁹, using monthly return observations from the previous 36 months ($t-36$ to $t-1$) and compute the difference between the actual fund return in month t and the return predicted by the model. This procedure yields rolling alphas at monthly frequency, $alpha_{jt}$, which we express in percentage points in all of our tests. We require at least 30 non-missing observations for this estimation, otherwise we set $alpha_{jt}$ to missing.¹⁰

⁹ The data is from the Kenneth French's website: http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/data_library.html. We thanks the authors for making this data available.

¹⁰ Our results are robust to the choice of the estimation window. However, many funds in our sample have long return series which stretch across different market cycles. The three-year period allows reasonable statistical accuracy in the estimation without imposing the condition that the factor loadings have to remain constant over a long period of time.

Our main right-hand side variables are designed to measure the financial security of the manager's family during his/her childhood years. For our initial tests we consider four different variables: *FatherIncome*, *ParIncome*, *Rent*, and *HomeValue*. The first two most accurately reflect the family's earnings as of 1940 and are available for the full sample. *Rent* and *HomeValue* are defined on the non-overlapping sub-samples thus reducing the number of observations available for analysis. However, it is still helpful to compare the results for these two variables to evaluate the robustness of our findings in the sub-samples of rented and owned properties. In addition, *HomeValue* is the least accurate proxy for the family's financial well-being because it is self-reported by the respondents (in increments of \$500) and can reflect overly optimistic valuations of the owners or simply the historical purchase price of the house, however old. *Rent* is a more accurate proxy, yet, in addition to income, it also depends on the renting needs of the family (e.g., as evidenced by the summary statistics, the rent is higher for larger families). We collectively call the four right-hand side variables *HHWealth* (short for "household wealth") and run the following regression specifications:

$$\alpha_{mjt} = \beta HHWealth_m + \Gamma_1 \times \mathbf{MCONTROLS}_{mt-1} + \Gamma_2 \times \mathbf{FCONTROLS}_{jt-1} + (\alpha_Y + \delta_s) + \varepsilon_{mjt}, \quad (1)$$

where j indexes funds, t (Y) indexes months (years), m indexes managers, and s denotes Morningstar fund style. *HHWealth* is one of the four measures of the household wealth in 1940. **MCONTROLS** is a vector of controls for the manager which includes *Gender* (equal to 1 if the manager is a male and 0 if she is a female), *ManagerAge* (the difference between the observation year and the manager's birth year), and a set of education and employment characteristics described in the previous section, namely, *ParYearsEdu*, *HasGraduate*, *HasMBA*, *AdmissionRate*, *FinanceRelated*, and *Managerial*. **FCONTROLS** is a vector of standard fund and fund family controls which includes *FundSize* (log of the fund's TNA in millions of dollars), *FundAge* (the time in years from the month of the fund's first appearance in the sample to month $t-1$), *FirmSize* (log of the mutual fund family TNA in millions of dollars), and *LogFirmNFunds* (log of the number of funds in the family). All the controls are measured as of the end of month $t-1$. Some specifications also include time fixed effects or style fixed effects or both, since investment opportunities

can fluctuate with time-varying market conditions (even though much of this effect is cleansed in the construction of *alpha*) and the manager's actions can be constrained by the style mandate within which the fund operates. In these tests and in all the analysis throughout this paper, the standard errors are clustered at the fund level.

We report the results in Table 3. Both *FatherIncome* and *ParIncome* are strongly negatively related to *alpha*, with the coefficients from all the specifications significant at 1%. The same negative pattern holds for *Rent*, although the coefficients are only significant at 5% or 10%. Finally, *HomeValue* is also robustly negatively related to *alpha* but the coefficients fall short of statistical significance. It is probably not surprising that the strength of the results is decreasing in the accuracy of the measurement, compounded by the smaller sample sizes for the last two variables. Therefore, in our future tests we concentrate on *ParIncome* as the main variable of interest.

To evaluate economic magnitudes, consider two managers whose *ParIncome* differs by 1 (\$1,000), which is close to the variable's interquartile range of 0.834. The monthly alpha for the manager with the higher *ParIncome* is lower by 11.25 bp (1.35% annualized).¹¹ To compare, the median monthly alpha in the sample is only -2.89 bp (-0.35% annualized). Considering that our managers have long careers, the difference in the compounded risk-adjusted returns earned by different manager types over the years can be substantial, underscoring the importance of the quality signalling mechanism discussed in this paper.

Other interesting results garnered from Table 1 concern the effects of gender and the parents' education and employment. An increase in the parents' education of 5 years translates to an increase in the manager's monthly alpha of 14.75 (1.77% annualized). In contrast, the full-sample effects of the manager's MBA degree and the university admission rate are mostly insignificant, even though both have

¹¹ All the effects in this section are computed from the coefficients in the full specification, e.g., $-0.1125 \times 1 = 11.25$ bp.

the expected signs.¹² *Gender* and *FinanceRelated* dummies are robustly significant in all the specifications. The average monthly alpha for male managers is higher by 28.73 bp (3.45% annualized)¹³ and is 21.24 bp (2.55% annualized) higher for managers coming from families with some financial expertise. The economic effects for the dummy variables are generally big as these variables only assumes extreme values of 0 or 1. Importantly though, the presence of these controls and relevant fixed effects does not detract from the significance of the income variables: managers from less privileged families tend to perform better.

The strength of this result becomes even more apparent if we consider the fact that various unobserved effects should favor richer managers and improve their performance. Even though we strive to control for different aspects of the manager's skill set and the manager's family's expertise, potentially important omitted variables always exist in these kind of studies. However, a reasonable endogeneity argument would point to a positive relationship between the parents' wealth and the manager's performance. For example, individuals from wealthier families have better connections and access to resources, which should aid the portfolio management task. And yet, these same privileges make it possible to make career advancements without showing strong performance, and only if this biased selection channel is in full effect, would we find a negative relationship between the manager's performance and his/her endowed wealth. In the next section we explore the advancement hypothesis directly by studying the link between managers' promotions and their parents' wealth.

IV. Promotion and past performance

¹² Because the education variables are highly correlated among themselves, we do not include all possible controls of the same type (e.g., proxies for university quality) in one regression but rather aim to capture different facets of the education.

¹³ While males have been shown to be more aggressive traders (e.g., Barber and Odean (2001)), the performance gap documented here cannot be entirely attributed to greater risk-taking by the male managers because our left-hand side measure is risk-adjusted. Yet it is possible that the standard risk-adjustment methodology cannot completely eliminate the effects of all forms of risk-taking on fund performance.

If we could observe the whole set of prospective managers and compare it to the set of managers eventually selected into the profession, this study would be trivial. Even though we cannot conduct such a test, we can consider its in-sample analogue: conditional on being in the sample, a manager from a wealthier family should find it easier to get promoted, while a manager from a poor family is only promoted if he/she proves his/her high-quality type, i.e. shows strong performance. Effectively, we are assuming that the selection mechanisms related to family wealth play a similar role in promotions as they play in the original selection.

To identify plausible "promotion events" in our sample we focus on the number of funds the manager controls and the aggregate assets of these funds. We define as promotion an event when the number of funds the manager is in charge of increases or when his/her managed assets increase in such a way that this growth cannot be attributed to investors' flows or returns earned by the funds. These two promotion events are typically related: the assets grow significantly because a new fund is added to the manager's portfolio, but sometimes the assets of the old fund increase because another fund is merged with it. We do not attempt to identify any "demotion events" because most demotions result in the termination of the manager's employment and his/her exit from the sample. However, we cannot use sample exits to proxy for these firing events because managers can, and most often do, exit the sample when they voluntarily accept a new position outside of the mutual fund industry (e.g., become hedge fund managers).

Formally, we define two left-hand side variables as follows. *IncreaseFunds* is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the number of funds the manager manages in the observation month is higher than in the previous month, and 0 otherwise. *IncreaseAssetsX2* is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the manager's total managed assets in dollars in the observation month is more than double the assets in the previous month, and 0 otherwise. Next, we relate these promotion dummies to the manager's parents' income, his/her past performance, and the interaction between the two. For this analysis we only consider managers with at least five years of data and for these managers we define past performance as the average monthly alpha

delivered by the manager over the past 36 or 60 months ending with month $t-1$. The full regression specification is a linear probability model with fixed effects, where indicated:

$$\begin{aligned}
 promotion_{mjt} = & \beta_1 pastalpha_{mt-1} + \beta_2 ParIncome_m + \beta_3 pastalpha_{mt-1} * ParIncome_m + \\
 & + \Gamma_1 \times MCONTROLS_{mt-1} + \Gamma_2 \times FCONTROLS_{jt-1} (+ \alpha_Y + \delta_F) + \varepsilon_{mjt} .
 \end{aligned} \tag{2}$$

In this regression, **MCONTROLS (FCONTROLS)** includes a vector of performance-unrelated manager-level (fund- and mutual fund family- level) control variables that are likely to influence promotion. We consider specifications with fund family fixed effects because employment policies are generally set at the management company level and are likely to differ in the cross-section of firms. Table 4 presents the results from this test. In the left pane the manager's past performance is measured over the 36-month horizon (*Past3YearAlpha*) and in the right pane it is measured over the 60-month horizon (*Past5YearAlpha*).

First, we notice that conditional on neutral performance (past alpha equal to zero), managers from wealthier families are more likely to be promoted. This effect is significant at the 5% level or better in six out of eight specifications. To evaluate its economic magnitude, we note that the unconditional probability of a manager's promotion in a given month is 0.981% for *IncreaseFunds* and 0.969% for *IncreaseAssetsX2*. In other words, every month an average manager in our sample stands approximately a 1% chance of being promoted. Given neutral performance, an increase in *ParIncome* of 1 (\$1,000) is associated with an increase in promotion probability by 0.75% for *IncreaseFunds* and 0.49% for *IncreaseAssetsX2* (coefficients from the full specifications in columns 2 and 4), which constitute a relative increase in promotion chances by a factor of 1.76 and 1.51, respectively.

Second, there is some evidence that the promotion-to-performance sensitivity is higher for managers from less wealthy families; in other words, these managers need to demonstrate better performance in order to get promoted. The interaction coefficient has a consistent negative sign and is significant at the 10% level or better in five specifications. We can evaluate the marginal economic effect by comparing the gap in promotion probabilities at different levels of past performance (e.g., at past alpha

of -1% and +1%) for two managers whose parents' incomes are at the 25th and the 75th percentiles, respectively (*ParIncome* of 0.78 and 1.5). Using the coefficients from the full specification for *Past5YearAlpha* (last column in the table), we can compute the relative promotion probability gap at *Past5YearAlpha* = -1% as $(0.97\% - 0.35\%) / 0.35\% = 1.73$ ¹⁴ and the same gap at *Past5YearAlpha* = +1% as $(0.39\% - 0.35\%) / 0.35\% = 0.10$. In other words, managers from families at the 25th percentile of *ParIncome* need to deliver performance of approximately 1% monthly (12% annualized) to stand an equal chance of promotion. For lower levels of performance the less wealthy are promoted less and the discrimination gap increases the weaker the performance.¹⁵

We should note that while the evidence on the selective promotion is not definitive given our measurement methodology, the actual promotion can be achieved in numerous ways which we do not capture. A connected manager can be "promoted" by receiving a more lucrative compensation package or a more senior title, without being given extra funds to manage. It is also likely that the selection mechanism is much stronger at the time of entry to a job than at the time of a possible promotion, especially considering that the selected pool of managers from less privileged backgrounds already comprises the most talented.

V. Fund management activities

In this section we investigate whether managers from poorer backgrounds are more active on the job. In a way, we want to test a "quiet life" hypothesis that posits that wealthy individuals have little incentives to apply effort and simply follow the path of least resistance.

Of course, there are different measures of "activity" in fund management. Most of them are based on an idea that active managers deviate more from the market or index behavior and tend to trade more frequently. Therefore, we consider the following variables to proxy for activity, each variable reflecting a

¹⁴ For the less wealthy: $(-1) * 0.0031 + 0.0045 * 0.78 - 0.0040 * (-1) * 0.78 = 0.35\%$.
For the wealthier: $(-1) * 0.0031 + 0.0045 * 1.5 - 0.0040 * (-1) * 1.5 = 0.97\%$.

¹⁵ Concerning the other variables which can conceivably influence promotion, we observe from the univariate regression on *Gender* that women are promoted less often; however the coefficient changes sign when we control for past performance, which we found to be strongly related to *Gender* in regression (1).

particular aspect of a fund manager's strategy (see Appendix 3 for the details on the variables' construction, all fractional variables are expressed in percentage points: e.g., the herding variable based on the correlation of 0.3 has the value of 30).¹⁶

$MarketDeviation_{jT}$ is computed as the standard error of the regression of fund j 's daily returns in quarter T on the daily returns on the CRSP value-weighted index and the Morningstar style dummies. This measure aims to capture how much of the variation in fund returns cannot be explained by market returns and the fund's mandated style. Funds' daily returns are reported in CRSP but only for a subset of funds, hence our number of observations for this variables is lower than for the other measures of activity.

$Turnover_{jT}$ is defined as the ratio of the sum of absolute values of dollar changes in equity positions of fund j from quarter $T-1$ to quarter T to the dollar value of the fund j 's equity portfolio at the end of quarter $T-1$ (similar to Gaspar, Massa, and Matos (2005)). The turnover measure captures the fraction of the portfolio that is "new" relative to the previous quarter.

$HoldingHorizon_{jT}$ measures how many days on average the shares that comprise fund j 's portfolio at the end of quarter T are held in the portfolio. This variable is calculated as in Lan, Moneta and Wermers (2015) "FIFO Horizon Measure" and is based on the assumption that shares bought first are also sold first.

$ActiveShare_{jT}$ is defined as the share of portfolio holdings of fund j at the end of quarter T that differ from the fund's benchmark index holdings (Cremers and Petajisto (2009), Petajisto (2013)) and is obtained from Antto Petajisto's personal website.¹⁷

$HerdingShares_{jT}$ ($HerdingWeight_{jT}$) is computed as the correlation between changes in holdings, as measured by the percentage changes in the number of shares held (the percentage changes in the weights of the stocks in the portfolio), of fund j from quarter $T-1$ to quarter T and correspondent changes

¹⁶ Most of the variables in this section make use of quarterly portfolio holdings disclosed in CDA filings and distributed by Thomson Reuters. We match Morningstar funds to funds in the CRSP Mutual Fund Database by CUSIP of the share class (this match is nearly 100% accurate as evidenced by similar fund names and a 0.99 correlations between Morningstar and CRSP fund returns) and then match CRSP funds to CDA portfolios. In the latter step, we use the MF Links files maintained by Russ Wermers but extend the match to 2012 and verify its quality by visually comparing fund names.

¹⁷ <http://www.petajisto.net/data.html>. We are thankful to the authors for making their data available.

in holdings of a hypothetical average fund in the style, whose portfolio position in a given stock is calculated as the sum of the aggregate positions in the stock of all the funds in the style. By construction, each herding variable is constrained between -100 and 100 and is higher for funds whose trades are closer to the style's average in both direction and magnitude.

First, we examine how each of these activity variables is related to the parents' wealth by running the following regression specification:

$$activity_{mjT} = \beta ParIncome_m + \Gamma_1 \times MCONTROLS_{mT-1} + \Gamma_2 \times FCONTROLS_{jT-1} (+ \alpha_Y + \delta_s) + \varepsilon_{mjT}, \quad (3)$$

where the right-hand side variables are defined as in equation (1) and the left-hand side variables are our measures of activity for fund j in quarter T . Table 5, Panel A contains the results of the estimation.

For the first four measures the pattern is consistent: managers from less wealthy families are not more active. If anything, their funds' returns are easier to explain with the market-style model (the results significant at 1%), their portfolio turnover is lower (significant at 10% or better), their holding horizon is longer (significant at 10% or better), and their active share is smaller (borderline significant). The evidence on the herding measures is inconclusive and does not indicate a significant convergence of trades or their divergence from the style's average. To interpret economic magnitudes, let us consider the intuitive measures of *Turnover* and *HoldingHorizon*. The average (median) quarterly turnover in our sample is 37.6% (26.4%) while the average (median) holding horizon is 831 days (729 days). An increase in *ParIncome* of 1 (\$1,000) is associated with a 10.4% higher turnover and reduces the holding horizon by 164 days (the coefficients from the full specification are used).¹⁸

Next, we examine how different activities contribute to the manager's performance and whether this contribution effect varies with the manager's family wealth. To this purpose, we run the following regression specification with the same set of control variables as in regression (1):

$$alpha_{mjt} = \beta_1 ParIncome_m + \beta_2 activity_{mjT-1} + \beta_3 ParIncome_m * activity_{mjT-1} + \Gamma_1 \times MCONTROLS_{mt-1} + \Gamma_2 \times FCONTROLS_{jt-1} (+ \alpha_Y + \delta_s) + \varepsilon_{mjt}. \quad (4)$$

¹⁸ Our results are consistent with the findings of Barder and Odean (2001) that males tend to be more active investors. For all our measures the coefficient signs indicate greater activity of males: higher deviation from the market, higher turnover, and higher active share, but shorter holding horizon and lower herding.

We report the results in Table 5, Panel B. In terms of statistical significance, the effects are weak: only *Turnover* adds significantly more value in the hands of managers from poor families. However, all the interaction effects (except for the *ActiveShare* which also has the lowest statistical significance), directionally indicate that activities of managers from less wealthy families are more valuable for fund alpha. Combined with the evidence from Panel A, this analysis does not support the idea that managers born poor are more active unconditionally, but rather suggests that where such managers choose to be active, this activity is more productive. In other words, in the debate of selection on ability vs selection on effort, our results tend to favour the ability channel - the component which is more difficult to contract on and formally enforce.

VI. Robustness checks

As our first robustness check, we investigate whether our results are sensitive to the type of alpha we compute. In our original test in Table 3, we were using net returns as reported by the fund, since we were interested in the value effects from the perspective of a fund investor - net of fees. However, if we calculate the proxy for the gross return by adding the expense ratio¹⁹ ($grossret = (1+netreturn)*(1+expensratio)-1$) and then re-estimate the alpha and rerun our main tests, the results are almost identical (reported in Table 6).

Our next robustness check is based on a variable that, similar to the parents' income, can proxy for the ability of an individual to pass the selection hurdle without being skilled - the affiliation of the manager's university with the Ivy League. However, *IvyLeague* is more noisy than our measures of the endowed social status and is plausibly contaminated by skill-related effects, e.g. a manager can earn his/her admission into a prestigious university on his/her own merit. First, we verify in a simple cross-section that *IvyLeague* is strongly positively associated with the parents' wealth. These results are reported in Table 7, Panel A. All wealth measures except the noisiest one - *HomeValue* - are positively related to

¹⁹ Expense ratio is reported at an annual frequency; for months when it is not directly reported we use the latest available expense ratio (or the next available if the latest is missing). Expense ratios vary significantly in the cross-section but not in time-series, so this interpolation is unlikely to distort gross returns materially.

the probability of a manager's attending an Ivy League institution. For example, a \$1,000 higher parents' income makes it 11.4% more likely that a manager will graduate from Ivy League. Second, we examine the effect of *IvyLeague* on alpha after controlling for university-level characteristics that most directly proxy for the students' level of skill (ACT score) and the affordability of the program (tuition). The results from this test are reported in Table 7, Panel B. We find a weak and borderline significant evidence that, holding skill and expenses constant, a prestigious Ivy League degree detracts from the manager's ability to create value for fund shareholders (monthly alpha is 12.4 bp lower for Ivy League graduates). This latter result is consistent with our general argument that higher social status facilitates career advancement in the asset management industry and, *ceteris paribus*, serves as a negative signal of managerial quality.

Conclusion

We study the relation between fund managers' family backgrounds and their professional performance and find that managers from poor families deliver higher risk-adjusted returns than managers from rich families. Our evidence suggests that managers endowed with a low economic status at birth face higher entry barriers into asset management, and only the highest-quality candidates succeed in entering the profession. This explanation is supported by the evidence on managers' promotions, which shows that managers with a low endowed status must deliver higher returns to stand a comparable chance of promotion with their high-status peers. We explore possible mechanisms through which managers from poor families deliver higher performance and find evidence suggesting that these managers are no more active in their portfolios but that their activity adds more value.

We believe our findings have implications that extend beyond asset management. Our evidence suggests that an individual's social status at birth may serve as an important signal of quality in other industries with high barriers to entry, such as corporate management or professional services. We believe an increased focus on the role of an agent's family background can yield valuable insights into professional decisions of financial intermediaries, corporate managers, and other economic agents.

Appendix 2. Classification of education and employment

Panel A. Manager's scholarly specialization

We classify a manager as having a finance-related education if the manager either holds an MBA degree or holds any degree in one of the following fields of study:²⁰

Accountancy, Accounting, Applied Economics, Business, Business Administration, Business Economics, Business Finance, Business Management, Business Studies, Commerce, Corporate/Tax Law, Economics, Finance, Financial Controllershship, General Business, Industrial Economics, Investment Analysis, Investment Finance, Investments, Management, Mathematics Economics, Quantitative Business Analysis, Real Estate, Taxation, Taxes/Estates/Probate

We classify a manager as having a technical education (as opposed to the one in humanities) if the manager holds any degree in one of the following fields of study:

Aerospace Engineering, Applied Mathematics, Astronomy, Chemical Engineering, Civil Engineering, Commerce and Engineering, Computer Science, Econometrics, Electrical Engineering, Engineering, Industrial Engineering, Information Systems, Mathematics, Mechanical Engineering, Metallurgical Engineering, Physics, Physics of Fluids, Statistics

We classify a manager as having a psychology-related education if the manager holds any degree in any field of study that mentions words "psychology" or "psychological".

²⁰ This list is of course not exhaustive of all possible finance-related fields but is a subset of all the educational disciplines in our sample of managers.

Panel B. Parents' employment type

We classify a manager as having a parent with a finance-related employment and set the dummy variable *FinanceRelated* to 1 if for at least one of the parents the occupation and company fields from the personal Census records form one of the following pairs (occupation-company (where available)):

Accountant - Knitting, Accountant - Rail Road, Accountant - Telephone Co., Accountant - Irvington Co, Banker - Bank, Banker - Own business, Broker - Real estate, Broker - Stock Brokerage, Broker - Stock exchange, Broker- Brokerage house, Business executive - Home products, Cashier - Insurance Co, Cashier accountant - Restaurant, Executive - Brokerage, Executive - Manufacturing, Executive - Real Estate & Motion Pictures, Executive - Wholesale of automobiles, Executive manager, Executive officer - Oil drilling, Executive Vice President - Insurance, Financial analyst - S.E.C., Fund manager, Investment counsel - Investments, Investment manager - Fidelity investments, Investment specialist - Investments, Lawyer - Bank, Money manager - Investment fund, Owner - Insurance company, Owner of an investment company, President - Aluminum manufacturing, President - Paint Co, Proprietor - Bag factory, Proprietor - Plastics company, Salesmen - Insurance, Stockbroker - Bonding company, Teller - Bank, Trader - Stock exchange, Treasurer - Cotton business, Underwriter - GusCo

In all other cases where the data on the parents' employment is available, we set *FinanceRelated* to 0.

We classify a manager as having a parent with a managerial employment and set the dummy variable *Managerial* to 1 if for at least one of the parents the occupation and company fields from the personal Census records form one of the following pairs (occupation-company (where available)):

Banker - Own business, Director of manufactory, Estate manager, Executive - Brokerage, Executive - Manufacturing, Executive - Real Estate & Motion Pictures, Executive - Wholesale of automobiles, Executive manager, Executive officer - Oil drilling, Executive Vice President - Insurance, Fund manager, Government official - City government, Investment manager - Fidelity investments, Manager - Chicor Plant, Manager - Ladies' Dress Shop, Manager - Telephone equipment, Money manager - Investment fund, Owner - Chain of clothing stores, Owner - Clothing retail, Owner - Cotton estates, Owner - Hardware store, Owner - Insurance company, Owner manager - Linen supply, Owner of an investment company, Owner operator - Pool hall, President - Aluminum manufacturing, President - Paint Co, Property manager - Property management, Proprietor - Bag factory, Proprietor - Plastics company, Shop owner - General shop, Supervisor

In all other cases where the data on the parents' employment is available, we set *Managerial* to 0.

Appendix 3. Definitions of variables used in the analysis

The following indexing convention is used:

m denotes a manager, j denotes a fund, t denotes a month, T denotes a calendar quarter

Variable name	Description
Household wealth	
$FatherIncome_m$	The annual income of the father of manager m as per the Census record. This variable is expressed in \$000 (thousands of dollars).
$ParIncome_m$	The average of the incomes of manager m 's father and mother, if both are available in the Census record (the mother's income is recorded as 0 if she is unemployed), or only the father's income, if the mother's income is not available. This variable is expressed in \$000.
$Rent_m$	The monthly rent in dollars paid by manager m 's parents' household as per the Census record. This variable is only reported if the family rented the accommodation.
$HomeValue_m$	The self-reported value of the house (in increments of \$500) of manager m 's parents' household as per the Census record. This variable is only reported if the family owned the property and is expressed in \$000.
Parents' education and employment	
$FatherYearsEdu_m$	The total years of education of manager m 's father by the time of the Census, assuming 8 years for elementary school and 4 years for high school (same as in the Census Tract summary files).
$ParYearsEdu_m$	The average of total years of education of manager m 's father and mother, if both are available in the Census record, or only the father's total years of education, if the mother's education record is not available.
$FinanceRelated_m$	An indicator variable equal to 1 if either of the manager m 's parents was employed in a finance-related occupation, as classified in Appendix 2.
$Managerial_m$	An indicator variable equal to 1 if either of the manager m 's parents was employed in a managerial occupation, as classified in Appendix 2.
Manager's demographics and education	
$Gender_m$	An indicator variable equal to 1 if manager m is a male and 0 if she is a female.
$ManagerAge_{mt(T)}$	The difference between the year which contains month t (quarter T) and manager m 's birth year.

$HasGraduate_m$	An indicator variable equal to 1 if manager m has a graduate degree. ²¹
$HasMBA_m$	An indicator variable equal to 1 if manager m has an MBA degree.
$HasPhD_m$	An indicator variable equal to 1 if manager m has a PhD degree.
$IvyLeague_m$	An indicator variable equal to 1 if manager m 's undergraduate institution belongs to the Ivy League club.
$AdmissionRate_m$	The undergraduate admission rate for manager m 's undergraduate institution as reported in the 1979 College Handbook.
$Tuition_m$	The in-state undergraduate annual tuition for manager m 's undergraduate institution as reported in the 1979 College Handbook.
$ACTMedian_m$	The median ACT score for manager m 's undergraduate institution as reported in the 2004 College Handbook.
Mutual fund and fund family controls	
$FundSize_{jt(T)}$	Log(1 + fund j 's TNA in \$000 at the end of month t (quarter T)).
$FundAge_{jt(T)}$	The time in years from the month of fund j 's first appearance in the sample to the end of month t (quarter T).
$FirmSize_{jt(T)}$	Log(1 + fund j 's total family TNA in \$000 at the end of month t (quarter T)).
$LogFirmNFunds_{jt(T)}$	Log(the number of funds in fund j 's fund family at the end of month t (quarter T)).
$Style_j$	Fund j 's Morningstar style (Large Blend, Large Growth, Large Value, Mid Blend, Mid Growth, Mid Value, Small Blend, Small Growth, or Small Value).
Promotion indicators	
$IncreaseFunds_{mjt}$	An indicator variable equal to 1 if the number of funds controlled by manager m in charge of fund j at the end of month t is higher than at the end of month $t-1$.
$IncreaseAssetsX2_{mjt}$	An indicator variable equal to 1 if the total dollar assets controlled by manager m in charge of fund j at the end of month t is more than double the assets at the end of month $t-1$.
Fund performance and management activity	
$alpha_{jt}$ ($gralpha_{jt}$)	Fund j 's net (gross) return in month t minus the fitted value from the four-factor model for which the loadings are estimated over the period ($t-1$, $t-36$). If during the estimation period fewer than 30 observations are non-missing, $alpha_{jt}$ ($gralpha_{jt}$) is set to missing. The variable is expressed in

²¹ Indicator variables characterizing education are set to missing if we cannot reliably establish whether a manager holds a particular degree.

	pp (percentage points).
<i>Past3YearAlpha_{mt}</i>	The average monthly alpha taken across all the fund-month observations for manager <i>m</i> in the period $(t-35,t)$.
<i>Past5YearAlpha_{mt}</i>	The average monthly alpha taken across all the fund-month observations for manager <i>m</i> in the period $(t-59,t)$.
<i>MarketDeviation_{jT}</i>	The standard error of the regression of fund <i>j</i> 's daily returns in pp in quarter <i>T</i> on the corresponding daily returns on the CRSP value-weighted index and the Morningstar style dummies.
<i>Turnover_{jT}</i>	<p>The ratio of the sum of the absolute dollar changes in fund <i>j</i>'s stock positions from quarter <i>T</i>-1 to quarter <i>T</i> to the fund's equity portfolio size in dollars in quarter <i>T</i>-1. Formally,</p> $\frac{\sum_{i \in j_T} NS_{iT} * P_{iT} - NS_{iT-1} * P_{iT-1} }{\sum_{i \in j_{T-1}} (NS_{iT-1} * P_{iT-1})},$ <p>where NS_{iT} is the number of shares of stock <i>i</i> held by fund <i>j</i> at the end of quarter <i>T</i> and P_{iT} is the price of stock <i>i</i> at the end of quarter <i>T</i>.</p>
<i> HoldingHorizon_{jT}</i>	First, for each stock <i>i</i> in fund <i>j</i> 's portfolio at the end of quarter <i>T</i> , we calculate the average number of days that its shares are held in the portfolio, using the FIFO assumption as in Lan, Moneta and Wermers (2015). Next, we aggregate these stock-level variables to the fund level as the weighted average measure in which the weights are proportional to the stocks' portfolio weights.
<i>ActiveShare_{jT}</i>	A measure of fund <i>j</i> 's deviation from the portfolio weights in the benchmark index at the end of quarter <i>T</i> . See Cremers and Petajisto (2009) and Petajisto (2013) for the construction methodology. This variable is expressed in pp.
<i>HerdingShares_{jT} (HerdingWeight_{jT})</i>	First, we construct a hypothetical style portfolio by aggregating (for each stock and quarter) the dollar positions of all funds in the style. Next, for fund <i>j</i> in quarter <i>T</i> we compute the correlation (across all the stocks in the style portfolio) of the percentage changes in the number of shares held by (changes in the portfolio weights of) fund <i>j</i> from quarter <i>T</i> -1 to quarter <i>T</i> with the corresponding changes in positions of the style portfolio. This variable is expressed in pp.

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Table 1. Data statistics

This table shows summary statistics (Panel A) and sample composition statistics (Panel B) for our main sample which contains 162 managers. Basic information on managers' careers and education is obtained from Morningstar/FactSet and Lexis Personal Records and is complemented by university records. Managers' parents' household data is from 1940 Census records. Tract-level demographic data is retrieved from summary files for 1940 Census compiled by Elizabeth Bogue. Mutual fund and family characteristics are from Morningstar. The procedure for the classification of fund managers' scholarly specialization and their parents' employment type is described in Appendix 2. In Panel B, the percentage of observations in each category is computed relative to the number of observations for which the respective categorization was possible.

Panel A. Common summary statistics

	mean	st. dev.	10 perc	25 perc	median	75 perc	90 perc
<i>Manager's basic information</i>							
Year of birth	1937.0	8.0	1929.0	1935.0	1939.0	1942.0	1944.0
Career length, years	14.6	10.2	4.42	6.42	11.58	21.17	27.92
Maximum (across years of career) assets managed, mil USD	4,731.31	28,973.86	43.82	138.90	694.37	1,716.75	5,853.79
<i>Manager's educational institution (as of 1980, unless stated otherwise)</i>							
University stand. score rank (SAT, 2004)	85.6	13.6	64.0	77.0	91.5	97.0	98.0
University stand. score (median ACT, 2004)	27.77	2.99	23.50	25.00	28.00	30.50	31.00
University size (undergraduate enrollment)	9,922	9,728	1,463	3,061	6,480	12,382	25,146
University tuition	3,281	1,924	714	975	3,850	5,040	5,550
Admission rate	52.4%	25.2%	20.7%	27.3%	52.4%	77.4%	85.7%
<i>Manager's household (individual census data, 1940)</i>							
Home value	9,256	6,644	3,000	5,000	7,500	12,000	20,000
Monthly rent	49.37	44.51	15.00	30.00	40.00	50.00	83.00
Number of siblings	0.96	1.55	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.0	2.0
Number of servants	0.06	0.30	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Father							
Year of birth	1905.0	11.7	1890.0	1900.0	1907.0	1912.0	1918.0
Income	2300.8	1414.1	600.0	1200.0	2045.0	3200.0	5000.0
Years of education	11.9	3.9	8.0	9.0	12.0	16.0	16.0
Mother							
Year of birth	1908.2	9.4	1896.0	1904.0	1910.0	1914.5	1918.0
Income	129.4	365.5	0	0	0	0	675
Years of education	11.8	3.4	8.0	10.0	12.0	14.0	16.0

Panel A, continued

<i>Tract-level demographics (Census 1940)</i>							
Median home value	5,312	2,715	2,211	3,938	5,098	6,072	9,070
Median rent, contract	38.81	12.18	20.62	30.93	40.12	46.57	52.71
Median rent, gross	44.06	12.49	29.13	35.76	45.58	50.78	59.16
Fraction of population without school education	5.5%	8.7%	0.2%	0.5%	1.4%	5.9%	17.0%
Fraction of population with college education	15.5%	12.8%	2.9%	3.8%	11.3%	24.6%	35.1%
Median education years	9.7	2.2	7.5	8.1	8.9	12.1	12.6
Fraction of population with paid employment	75.5%	8.0%	64.1%	71.9%	77.6%	81.5%	82.9%

<i>Managed funds' characteristic</i>							
Monthly net return	0.98%	4.94%	-4.73%	-1.57%	1.26%	3.74%	6.43%
Monthly net return volatility	4.58%	1.94%	2.44%	3.16%	4.29%	5.58%	7.04%
Monthly net alpha	-0.04%	2.16%	-2.27%	-1.02%	-0.03%	0.92%	2.11%
End-of-quarter TNA, mil USD	1,040.45	4,769.59	11.34	38.00	142.87	584.83	1,876.95
End-of-quarter family TNA, mil USD	9,309.72	29,106.43	27.62	155.69	1,501.69	6,095.47	20,450.28
End-of-quarter number of holdings	84.2	78.3	26.0	35.0	57.0	101.0	169.0

Panel B. Sample composition statistics

Manager's education

	Has graduate degree	Has PhD	Has MBA	Finance-related education	Technical education	Psychology education
Manager	66.00%	2.19%	56.20%	93.14%	8.00%	1.00%

Household education (individual census data, 1940)

	Elementary	High school	College
Father	97.78%	76.30%	42.22%
Mother	99.25%	78.20%	40.60%

Household employment (individual census data, 1940)

	Private worker (PW)	Gov. worker (GW)	Own account (OA)	Employer (E)	Unpaid worker (NP)	Finance-related	Managerial
Father	69.84%	8.73%	15.08%	6.35%	0.00%	20.00%	12.41%
Mother	88.24%	0.00%	11.76%	0.00%	0.00%		

Fund Morningstar style composition

	Large Blend	Mid Blend	Small Blend
	19.00%	3.83%	5.95%
	Large Growth	Mid Growth	Small Growth
	32.28%	12.31%	6.74%
	Large Value	Mid Value	Small Value
	15.21%	1.59%	3.09%

Table 2. Correlation tables for the main variables

This table shows the correlation coefficients among our main variables of interest focusing on the demographic characteristics of households and Census tracts in Panel A and the education-related variables in Panel B. The procedure for the classification of fund managers' scholarly specialization and their parents' employment type is described in Appendix 2. The variable construction methodologies are detailed in Appendix 3.

Panel A. Household and tract characteristics

	Father's income	Parents' income	Home value	Rent	Num. siblings	Num. servants	Home value, tract	Contract rent, tract	Gross rent, tract	Father's educ.	Parents' educ.	Finance emp.	Manag. emp.
Father's income	1.000	0.845	0.423	0.700	-0.190	0.282	0.117	0.096	0.019	0.495	0.503	0.453	0.341
Parents' income	0.845	1.000	0.124	0.581	-0.176	0.255	0.131	0.164	0.127	0.467	0.474	0.267	0.186
Home value	0.423	0.124	1.000		0.024	0.328	0.218	-0.136	-0.232	-0.024	0.032	0.550	0.244
Rent	0.700	0.581		1.000	0.055	0.473	-0.058	0.138	0.077	0.423	0.460	0.414	0.500
Number of siblings	-0.190	-0.176	0.024	0.055	1.000	0.098	-0.266	-0.338	-0.324	-0.152	-0.180	-0.009	-0.041
Number of servants	0.282	0.255	0.328	0.473	0.098	1.000	-0.298	-0.085	-0.098	0.155	0.194	0.284	-0.008
Home value, tract median	0.117	0.131	0.218	-0.058	-0.266	-0.298	1.000	0.592	0.554	0.198	0.169	-0.207	0.241
Contract rent, tract median	0.096	0.164	-0.136	0.138	-0.338	-0.085	0.592	1.000	0.975	0.015	0.064	-0.120	0.049
Gross rent, tract median	0.019	0.127	-0.232	0.077	-0.324	-0.098	0.554	0.975	1.000	-0.013	0.046	-0.092	-0.043
Father's years of education	0.495	0.467	-0.024	0.423	-0.152	0.155	0.198	0.015	-0.013	1.000	0.931	0.195	0.016
Parents' years of education	0.503	0.474	0.032	0.460	-0.180	0.194	0.169	0.064	0.046	0.931	1.000	0.237	0.092
Finance-related employment	0.453	0.267	0.550	0.414	-0.009	0.284	-0.207	-0.120	-0.092	0.195	0.237	1.000	0.335
Managerial employment	0.341	0.186	0.244	0.500	-0.041	-0.008	0.241	0.049	-0.043	0.016	0.092	0.335	1.000

Panel B. Household characteristics and managers' education

	Man. gender	Father's income	Parents' income	Home value	Rent	Father's educ.	Parents' educ.	Finance emp.	Manag. emp.	Graduate	PhD	MBA	Ivy League	Tuition	Adm. rate	ACT, median	SAT, rank	Finance field	Techn. field	Psych. field
Manager's gender	1.000	-0.005	-0.001	0.105	0.074	-0.004	-0.048	0.094	-0.043	0.024	0.029	0.064	0.081	-0.026	-0.122	-0.007	0.057	-0.047	0.052	0.018
Father's income	-0.005	1.000	0.845	0.423	0.700	0.495	0.503	0.453	0.341	-0.124	-0.135	-0.025	0.409	0.455	-0.320	0.387	0.354	0.206	-0.274	0.124
Parents' income	-0.001	0.845	1.000	0.124	0.581	0.467	0.474	0.267	0.186	-0.106	-0.069	0.023	0.287	0.392	-0.303	0.321	0.313	0.188	-0.198	0.060
Home value	0.105	0.423	0.124	1.000		-0.024	0.032	0.550	0.244	-0.189	0.022	-0.100	0.017	0.288	-0.374	0.356	0.367	-0.044	0.040	
Rent	0.074	0.700	0.581		1.000	0.423	0.460	0.414	0.500	-0.144	-0.043	-0.140	0.531	0.387	-0.371	0.413	0.355	0.032	-0.016	-0.016
Father's years of education	-0.004	0.495	0.467	-0.024	0.423	1.000	0.931	0.195	0.016	0.037	0.056	-0.005	0.270	0.380	-0.258	0.220	0.275	0.078	-0.089	0.000
Parents' years of education	-0.048	0.503	0.474	0.032	0.460	0.931	1.000	0.237	0.092	-0.023	0.103	-0.048	0.270	0.404	-0.242	0.265	0.324	0.129	-0.088	0.005
Finance-related employment	0.094	0.453	0.267	0.550	0.414	0.195	0.237	1.000	0.335	-0.123	0.086	-0.133	0.192	0.230	-0.206	0.206	0.217	0.116	-0.017	-0.052
Managerial employment	-0.043	0.341	0.186	0.244	0.500	0.016	0.092	0.335	1.000	-0.228	-0.055	-0.339	0.110	-0.027	-0.009	0.033	0.027	0.052	-0.058	-0.023
Has graduate degree	0.024	-0.124	-0.106	-0.189	-0.144	0.037	-0.023	-0.123	-0.228	1.000	0.094	0.715	-0.109	-0.018	0.050	0.032	-0.075	0.216	0.021	0.042
Has PhD	0.029	-0.135	-0.069	0.022	-0.043	0.056	0.103	0.086	-0.055	0.094	1.000	-0.170	-0.064	0.000	0.045	0.034	0.000	-0.295	0.484	-0.015
Has MBA	0.064	-0.025	0.023	-0.100	-0.140	-0.005	-0.048	-0.133	-0.339	0.715	-0.170	1.000	-0.033	-0.070	0.005	0.038	-0.044	0.444	-0.205	0.054
Ivy League institution	0.081	0.409	0.287	0.017	0.531	0.270	0.270	0.192	0.110	-0.109	-0.064	-0.033	1.000	0.461	-0.422	0.434	0.403	-0.004	-0.119	0.249
Tuition	-0.026	0.455	0.392	0.288	0.387	0.380	0.404	0.230	-0.027	-0.018	0.000	-0.070	0.461	1.000	-0.579	0.656	0.628	-0.047	-0.062	0.113
Admission rate	-0.122	-0.320	-0.303	-0.374	-0.371	-0.258	-0.242	-0.206	-0.009	0.050	0.045	0.005	-0.422	-0.579	1.000	-0.781	-0.716	0.085	-0.201	-0.148
ACT, median	-0.007	0.387	0.321	0.356	0.413	0.220	0.265	0.206	0.033	0.032	0.034	0.038	0.434	0.656	-0.781	1.000	0.955	-0.096	0.109	0.155
SAT, rank	0.057	0.354	0.313	0.367	0.355	0.275	0.324	0.217	0.027	-0.075	0.000	-0.044	0.403	0.628	-0.716	0.955	1.000	0.056	0.030	0.105
Finance-related field	-0.047	0.206	0.188	-0.044	0.032	0.078	0.129	0.116	0.052	0.216	-0.295	0.444	-0.004	-0.047	0.085	-0.096	0.056	1.000	-0.353	0.028
Technical field	0.052	-0.274	-0.198	0.040	-0.016	-0.089	-0.088	-0.017	-0.058	0.021	0.484	-0.205	-0.119	-0.062	-0.201	0.109	0.030	-0.353	1.000	-0.030
Psychology field	0.018	0.124	0.060		-0.016	0.000	0.005	-0.052	-0.023	0.042	-0.015	0.054	0.249	0.113	-0.148	0.155	0.105	0.028	-0.030	1.000

Table 3. Parents' household wealth and performance of fund managers

This tables shows the results from the regressions of the funds' four-factor monthly alphas (*alpha*, measured in pp) on the measures of the managers' parents' household wealth as of the time of the Census and a set of controls. *FatherIncome* (annual), *ParIncome* (annual) and *HomeValue* are measured in \$000 while *Rent* (monthly) is measured in \$. The control variables capture the manager's gender and age, his/her education attributes, his/her parents' education depth and employment type, as well as some mutual fund and fund family characteristics likely to affect performance. All the control variables are measured as of the end of the month before the observation month. The exact variable definitions are given in Appendix 3. The inclusion of Morningstar style fixed effects and time (year) fixed effects is indicated at the bottom of the table. T-statistics (reported in parentheses) are based on standard errors clustered at the fund level. * (**, ***) indicates the significance of the coefficient at the 10% (5%, 1%) level.

Independent variables	Dependent variable				Dependent variable				Dependent variable				Dependent variable			
	<i>alpha</i>	<i>alpha</i>	<i>alpha</i>	<i>alpha</i>	<i>alpha</i>	<i>alpha</i>	<i>alpha</i>	<i>alpha</i>	<i>alpha</i>	<i>alpha</i>	<i>alpha</i>	<i>alpha</i>	<i>alpha</i>	<i>alpha</i>	<i>alpha</i>	
	<i>HHWealth: (is proxied for by) FatherIncome</i>				<i>HHWealth: (is proxied for by) ParIncome</i>				<i>HHWealth: (is proxied for by) Rent</i>				<i>HHWealth: (is proxied for by) HomeValue</i>			
<i>HHWealth</i>	-0.0807*** (-3.10)	-0.0718*** (-2.67)	-0.0791*** (-3.23)	-0.0709*** (-2.74)	-0.1260*** (-3.25)	-0.1151*** (-2.95)	-0.1250*** (-3.59)	-0.1125*** (-3.14)	-0.0017** (-2.18)	-0.0017* (-1.98)	-0.0015** (-2.09)	-0.0014* (-1.87)	-0.0107 (-1.09)	-0.0098 (-0.99)	-0.0141 (-1.12)	-0.0093 (-0.68)
<i>Gender</i>	0.2410*** (3.70)	0.2319*** (3.67)	0.2814*** (4.31)	0.2729*** (4.18)	0.2629*** (4.12)	0.2520*** (4.00)	0.2984*** (4.56)	0.2873*** (4.33)	0.1714** (2.40)	0.1459** (2.20)	0.1957** (2.35)	0.1834** (2.36)	-0.0344 (-0.33)	-0.1221 (-1.28)	0.0418 (0.43)	-0.0467 (-0.52)
<i>FundSize</i>	-0.0653*** (-2.76)	-0.0620** (-2.57)	-0.0669*** (-3.16)	-0.0661*** (-2.95)	-0.0600*** (-2.65)	-0.0559** (-2.48)	-0.0616*** (-2.96)	-0.0598*** (-2.78)	-0.0287 (-1.54)	-0.0213 (-1.16)	-0.0416** (-2.05)	-0.0356* (-1.82)	-0.0935** (-2.51)	-0.0892** (-2.41)	-0.0962** (-2.45)	-0.0896** (-2.31)
<i>FundAge</i>	-0.0036 (-1.42)	-0.0033 (-1.25)	-0.0032 (-1.30)	-0.0025 (-0.99)	-0.0025 (-1.07)	-0.0024 (-0.99)	-0.0021 (-0.90)	-0.0016 (-0.67)	0.0014 (0.45)	0.0019 (0.50)	0.0001 (0.05)	-0.0004 (-0.12)	0.0018 (0.43)	0.0007 (0.19)	0.0047 (1.22)	0.0037 (0.96)
<i>ManagerAge</i>	0.0045 (1.36)	0.0037 (0.69)	0.0057* (1.76)	0.0067 (1.26)	0.0043 (1.35)	0.0024 (0.50)	0.0054* (1.78)	0.0053 (1.07)	-0.0047 (-1.21)	-0.0135* (-1.80)	-0.0039 (-1.11)	-0.0133* (-1.93)	0.0035 (0.59)	0.0056 (0.86)	-0.0002 (-0.03)	0.0039 (0.69)
<i>FirmSize</i>	0.0405 (1.40)	0.0367 (1.26)	0.0370 (1.38)	0.0348 (1.24)	0.0276 (0.92)	0.0243 (0.81)	0.0249 (0.90)	0.0231 (0.79)	0.0050 (0.20)	0.0002 (0.01)	0.0251 (0.90)	0.0207 (0.68)	0.0235 (0.60)	0.0227 (0.63)	0.0235 (0.60)	0.0245 (0.67)
<i>LogFirmNFunds</i>	-0.0096 (-0.22)	-0.0067 (-0.15)	-0.0011 (-0.03)	0.0025 (0.05)	0.0067 (0.15)	0.0076 (0.16)	0.0127 (0.29)	0.0148 (0.31)	0.0251 (0.56)	0.0227 (0.46)	0.0082 (0.18)	0.0087 (0.17)	0.0165 (0.30)	0.0219 (0.47)	0.0276 (0.47)	0.0297 (0.58)
<i>ParYearsEdu</i>	0.0330*** (2.74)	0.0313** (2.57)	0.0307*** (2.68)	0.0299** (2.48)	0.0318** (2.61)	0.0304** (2.54)	0.0302*** (2.62)	0.0295** (2.50)	0.0212** (2.01)	0.0178* (1.75)	0.0142 (1.43)	0.0103 (1.08)	-0.0099 (-0.56)	-0.0122 (-0.81)	0.0068 (0.41)	0.0055 (0.35)
<i>HasGraduate</i>	-0.0619 (-0.86)	-0.0565 (-0.75)	-0.0887 (-1.19)	-0.0722 (-0.93)	-0.1039 (-1.27)	-0.0989 (-1.18)	-0.1299 (-1.58)	-0.1128 (-1.34)	0.0393 (0.47)	0.0173 (0.19)	0.1103 (1.28)	0.0857 (0.96)	-0.0445 (-0.29)	-0.0480 (-0.36)	-0.0141 (-0.09)	0.0008 (0.00)
<i>HasMBA</i>	0.0735 (1.04)	0.0616 (0.79)	0.1282* (1.86)	0.1062 (1.42)	0.1009 (1.34)	0.0923 (1.13)	0.1505* (1.97)	0.1305 (1.59)	0.0788 (1.23)	0.0817 (1.14)	0.0695 (0.99)	0.0823 (1.05)	-0.2122 (-1.40)	-0.2141 (-1.53)	-0.1542 (-1.04)	-0.1807 (-1.30)
<i>AdmissionRate</i>	-0.1413 (-1.42)	-0.1053 (-0.99)	-0.1120 (-1.10)	-0.0760 (-0.70)	-0.2145** (-2.00)	-0.1778 (-1.57)	-0.1975* (-1.88)	-0.1560 (-1.39)	-0.2272* (-1.81)	-0.1987 (-1.50)	-0.2095* (-1.67)	-0.1901 (-1.45)	0.1166 (0.78)	0.0634 (0.45)	0.2232* (1.74)	0.1527 (1.16)
<i>FinanceRelated</i>	0.2475*** (3.76)	0.2392*** (3.59)	0.2523*** (3.92)	0.2457*** (3.76)	0.2103*** (3.87)	0.2074*** (3.90)	0.2149*** (4.04)	0.2124*** (4.07)	0.1812*** (3.49)	0.1789*** (3.56)	0.1683*** (3.08)	0.1664*** (3.23)	0.2239** (2.14)	0.2365** (2.37)	0.3100*** (2.89)	0.2986*** (2.98)
<i>Managerial</i>	-0.0900 (-1.08)	-0.1055 (-1.14)	-0.0932 (-1.10)	-0.1142 (-1.32)	-0.1562* (-1.88)	-0.1556* (-1.68)	-0.1552* (-1.88)	-0.1633* (-1.95)	0.0279 (0.23)	0.1283 (0.72)	0.1416 (1.01)	0.2378 (1.45)	-0.2070* (-1.87)	-0.2147* (-1.99)	-0.1050 (-1.01)	-0.1291 (-1.28)
Time F.E.	NO	YES	NO	YES	NO	YES	NO	YES	NO	YES	NO	YES	NO	YES	NO	YES
Fund style F.E.	NO	NO	YES	YES	NO	NO	YES	YES	NO	NO	YES	YES	NO	NO	YES	YES
Num. obs.	12,138	12,138	12,138	12,138	12,138	12,138	12,138	12,138	7,292	7,292	7,292	7,292	5,358	5,358	5,358	5,358
Adj R-sq	0.0028	0.0156	0.0027	0.0154	0.0032	0.0160	0.0031	0.0157	0.0026	0.0144	0.0026	0.0144	0.0026	0.0211	0.0025	0.0208

Table 4. Parents' household wealth and managers' promotion chances

This table presents the results from the linear probability regressions of the manager's promotion dummies on his/her past performance, his/her parents' income at the time of the Census, and the interaction between the two. The promotion dummies indicate events when the number of funds the manager was in charge of increased from the previous month (*IncreaseFunds*) or the total assets the manager controlled increased by more than twofold from the previous month (*IncreaseAssetsX2*). Past performance is defined as the average monthly alpha of funds the manager managed over the past three (left pane) or five (right pane) years. The control variables include the manager's and the firm's characteristics likely to affect promotion and are measured as of the end of the month before the observation month. The exact variable definitions are given in Appendix 3. The inclusion of the mutual fund family fixed effects and time (year) fixed effects is indicated at the bottom of the table. T-statistics (reported in parentheses) are based on standard errors clustered at the fund level. * (**, ***) indicates the significance of the coefficient at the 10% (5%, 1%) level.

	Dependent variable					Dependent variable			
	<i>Increase Funds</i>	<i>Increase Funds</i>	<i>Increase AssetsX2</i>	<i>Increase AssetsX2</i>		<i>Increase Funds</i>	<i>Increase Funds</i>	<i>Increase AssetsX2</i>	<i>Increase AssetsX2</i>
Indep. variables					Indep. variables				
<i>Past3YearAlpha</i>	0.0025 (0.69)	-0.0015 (-0.45)	0.0018 (0.74)	0.0028 (1.21)	<i>Past5YearAlpha</i>	0.0073* (1.74)	0.0003 (0.08)	0.0025 (0.88)	0.0031 (1.01)
<i>ParIncome</i>	0.0015 (1.28)	0.0075*** (4.60)	0.0015** (2.07)	0.0049*** (3.77)	<i>ParIncome</i>	0.0016 (1.41)	0.0073*** (4.19)	0.0016** (2.17)	0.0045*** (3.61)
<i>Past3YearAlpha</i> <i>* ParIncome</i>	-0.0028 (-1.43)	-0.0016 (-0.75)	-0.0031* (-1.81)	-0.0027* (-1.80)	<i>Past5YearAlpha</i> <i>* ParIncome</i>	-0.0052** (-2.32)	-0.0029 (-0.98)	-0.0043** (-2.03)	-0.0040* (-1.89)
<i>Gender</i>	-0.0034 (-0.93)	-0.0078* (-1.81)	-0.0032 (-1.55)	-0.0077*** (-3.42)	<i>Gender</i>	-0.0036 (-0.96)	-0.0074* (-1.70)	-0.0030 (-1.43)	-0.0072*** (-2.96)
<i>FundSize</i>	0.0007 (0.77)	0.0004 (0.39)	0.0006 (1.65)	0.0004 (0.69)	<i>FundSize</i>	0.0007 (0.77)	0.0003 (0.35)	0.0006* (1.79)	0.0004 (0.68)
<i>FundAge</i>	-0.0003* (-1.85)	0.0001 (0.79)	-0.0001 (-0.87)	0.0001 (0.90)	<i>FundAge</i>	-0.0003* (-1.87)	0.0002 (0.85)	-0.0001 (-1.00)	0.0001 (0.92)
<i>ManagerAge</i>	-0.0001 (-0.80)	-0.0025 (-1.57)	-0.0002*** (-2.62)	-0.0022** (-2.24)	<i>ManagerAge</i>	-0.0001 (-0.85)	-0.0025 (-1.57)	-0.0002*** (-2.62)	-0.0022** (-2.24)
<i>FirmSize</i>	-0.0015 (-1.49)	-0.0006 (-0.19)	-0.0009** (-2.40)	-0.0028 (-1.60)	<i>FirmSize</i>	-0.0015 (-1.51)	-0.0005 (-0.18)	-0.0010** (-2.44)	-0.0029 (-1.63)
<i>LogFirmNFunds</i>	0.0058** (2.61)	-0.0013 (-0.26)	0.0014** (2.02)	0.0014 (0.38)	<i>LogFirmNFunds</i>	0.0057** (2.60)	-0.0008 (-0.17)	0.0014* (1.95)	0.0017 (0.47)
Time F.E.	NO	YES	NO	YES	Time F.E.	NO	YES	NO	YES
Fund family F.E.	NO	YES	NO	YES	Fund family F.E.	NO	YES	NO	YES
Num. obs.	11,925	11,807	11,915	11,797	Num. obs.	11,933	11,815	11,923	11,805
Adj R-sq	0.0033	0.0185	0.0029	0.0155	Adj R-sq	0.0035	0.0184	0.0034	0.0159

Table 5. Parents' household wealth and measures of fund management activity

This table shows the results from the tests that relate measures of fund management activity to the managers' parents' incomes and fund performance. Panel A shows the regressions of the activity measures on the parents' income (in \$000) and a set of controls. The activity measures capture how much of the fund's daily returns cannot be explained by the CRSP value-weighted index and style dummies (*MarketDeviation*), the fraction of the portfolio that is new relative to the previous quarter (*Turnover*, measured in pp), the average duration in days that the shares are held in the fund's portfolio (*HoldingHorizon*, based on the FIFO approach to purchases and sales), the fraction of the portfolio that deviates from the benchmark weights (*ActiveShare*, measured in pp), and the correlation between the changes in positions of the fund and the changes in positions of the style's hypothetical average fund (based either on the number of shares held (*HerdingShares*) or the portfolio weight (*HerdingWeight*), measured in pp). Panel B shows the regressions of funds' four-factor monthly alphas on the activity measures, the parents' income (in \$000), and the interaction between the two. The control variables capture the manager's gender and age, his/her education attributes, his/her parents' education depth and employment type, as well as some mutual fund and fund family characteristics likely to affect either activity or performance. All the control variables are measured as of the end of the previous month (Panel B) or quarter (Panel A). The exact variable definitions are given in Appendix 3. The inclusion of Morningstar style fixed effects and time (year) fixed effects is indicated at the bottom of the table. T-statistics (reported in parentheses) are based on standard errors clustered at the fund level. * (**, ***) indicates the significance of the coefficient at the 10% (5%, 1%) level.

Panel A. The effect of the parents' household wealth on the measures of fund management activity

	Dependent variable		Dependent variable		Dependent variable		Dependent variable		Dependent variable		Dependent variable	
	<i>Market Deviation</i>	<i>Market Deviation</i>	<i>Turnover</i>	<i>Turnover</i>	<i>Holding Horizon</i>	<i>Holding Horizon</i>	<i>Active Share</i>	<i>Active Share</i>	<i>Herding Shares</i>	<i>Herding Shares</i>	<i>Herding Weight</i>	<i>Herding Weight</i>
Indep. variables												
<i>ParIncome</i>	0.1384*** (3.12)	0.1234*** (2.83)	8.5622* (1.82)	10.3706** (2.42)	-122.622* (-1.92)	-164.075*** (-2.94)	3.4323* (1.93)	0.8422 (0.47)	-0.2215 (-0.08)	-0.7191 (-0.39)	1.7296 (0.73)	1.2977 (0.74)
<i>Gender</i>	0.1153* (1.97)	0.0769 (1.00)	8.4905 (0.94)	3.1965 (0.32)	-144.573 (-1.09)	-123.971 (-0.85)	5.3894 (1.52)	0.1387 (0.03)	-2.2080 (-0.53)	-15.2453*** (-4.87)	-5.5734 (-1.63)	-15.5966*** (-5.34)
<i>FundSize</i>	-0.0353** (-2.40)	-0.0174 (-1.65)	-8.9048*** (-3.20)	-7.7537*** (-2.90)	81.2831*** (2.88)	107.7726*** (4.15)	-4.0538*** (-4.52)	-2.7219*** (-3.37)	2.7851** (2.60)	4.7808*** (5.71)	2.6764** (2.42)	4.2387*** (4.86)
<i>FundAge</i>	-0.0008 (-0.23)	0.0010 (0.39)	-0.1866 (-0.40)	-0.4726 (-1.07)	4.5743 (0.83)	9.0158* (1.90)	0.3231** (2.02)	0.2783* (1.94)	-0.0427 (-0.22)	0.0194 (0.11)	0.1799 (1.08)	0.2300 (1.47)
<i>ManagerAge</i>	-0.0181*** (-4.68)	-0.0078 (-1.43)	-0.6065 (-1.66)	-2.1954*** (-3.48)	9.0090 (1.51)	7.9728 (0.99)	-0.3637** (-2.48)	0.0108 (0.05)	-0.9289*** (-3.76)	-0.6507** (-2.38)	-1.0835*** (-4.83)	-0.5730** (-2.05)
<i>FirmSize</i>	0.0181 (0.80)	-0.0143 (-0.86)	3.5305 (1.36)	2.6897 (0.99)	13.1207 (0.39)	-35.5359 (-1.11)	0.0123 (0.01)	-0.9620 (-1.14)	2.6329** (1.99)	1.0226 (1.03)	1.8648 (1.46)	0.7530 (0.84)
<i>LogFirmNFunds</i>	-0.0216 (-0.50)	0.0152 (0.51)	-1.6488 (-0.39)	-3.0624 (-0.71)	-81.2626 (-1.38)	-60.9417 (-1.15)	-0.2603 (-0.18)	0.2625 (0.19)	-3.1058 (-1.30)	-2.5527 (-1.53)	-3.1328 (-1.43)	-2.6932* (-1.91)
<i>ParYearsEdu</i>	-0.0170 (-1.46)	-0.0082 (-0.83)	-2.0790 (-1.41)	-2.4642* (-1.80)	12.7358 (0.66)	32.6655* (1.97)	-0.1991 (-0.38)	0.4582 (0.88)	-1.6149*** (-2.63)	-1.0190** (-2.12)	-1.6589*** (-2.87)	-1.1739*** (-2.71)
<i>HasGraduate</i>	-0.1564* (-1.95)	-0.0442 (-0.68)	-27.8418** (-2.53)	-29.8401*** (-2.84)	267.4779* (1.90)	179.1342 (1.19)	-14.2854*** (-3.25)	-9.4237** (-2.13)	-10.3551** (-2.11)	3.0680 (0.70)	-9.0089** (-2.26)	3.4616 (0.94)
<i>HasMBA</i>	0.0924 (1.16)	0.0693 (0.94)	20.4319*** (2.78)	24.5048** (2.48)	-245.430 (-1.65)	-99.0412 (-0.63)	12.9713*** (2.97)	7.0815 (1.43)	9.1558* (1.86)	-3.0359 (-0.70)	8.5552** (2.22)	-2.4081 (-0.68)
<i>AdmissionRate</i>	-0.1383 (-1.17)	-0.2166** (-2.02)	-29.5853* (-1.69)	-19.4122 (-1.14)	0.8057 (0.00)	32.6417 (0.18)	-3.3211 (-0.59)	-8.6678* (-1.80)	-7.8897 (-1.03)	-6.5938 (-1.15)	-10.1106 (-1.42)	-10.2576** (-2.17)
<i>FinanceRelated</i>	-0.1914*** (-2.96)	-0.1565*** (-2.85)	-19.8764** (-2.34)	-22.4865*** (-3.16)	240.4372* (1.84)	254.7207** (2.36)	1.1535 (0.39)	3.5849 (1.65)	6.8298* (1.91)	8.2678*** (3.06)	2.3073 (0.68)	3.4632 (1.56)
<i>Managerial</i>	0.0881 (0.99)	0.0123 (0.15)	-19.4145* (-1.75)	-7.2552 (-0.84)	-29.8435 (-0.23)	-10.6780 (-0.09)	-3.5701 (-1.28)	-3.6879 (-1.37)	-2.7328 (-0.55)	-5.6713 (-1.39)	0.4056 (0.08)	-2.9623 (-0.75)
Time F.E.	NO	YES	NO	YES	NO	YES	NO	YES	NO	YES	NO	YES
Fund style F.E.	NO	YES	NO	YES	NO	YES	NO	YES	NO	YES	NO	YES
Num. obs.	2,004	2,004	2,038	2,038	2,773	2,773	1,882	1,882	2,689	2,689	2,699	2,699
Adj R-sq	0.2571	0.5095	0.1009	0.1490	0.1726	0.4272	0.3453	0.5252	0.2322	0.4034	0.2241	0.3860

Panel B. The effect of the parents' household wealth on the contribution of fund management activities to fund performance

	Dependent variable		Dependent variable		Dependent variable		Dependent variable		Dependent variable		Dependent variable	
	<i>alpha</i>	<i>alpha</i>	<i>alpha</i>	<i>alpha</i>	<i>alpha</i>	<i>alpha</i>	<i>alpha</i>	<i>alpha</i>	<i>alpha</i>	<i>alpha</i>	<i>alpha</i>	<i>alpha</i>
Independent variables	Activity: <i>MarketDeviation</i>		Activity: <i>Turnover</i>		Activity: <i>HoldingHorizon</i>		Activity: <i>ActiveShare</i>		Activity: <i>HerdingShares</i>		Activity: <i>HerdingWeight</i>	
<i>ParIncome</i>	0.0602 (0.68)	0.0461 (0.40)	0.0452 (0.45)	0.0160 (0.16)	-0.3059*** (-3.46)	-0.2798*** (-3.30)	-0.2710 (-0.57)	-0.3061 (-0.67)	-0.1184* (-1.84)	-0.0905 (-1.63)	-0.1252* (-1.76)	-0.1037 (-1.60)
<i>Activity</i>	70.0024*** (2.80)	28.9587 (0.87)	0.3579* (1.79)	0.2962 (1.43)	-0.0001 (-1.11)	-0.0001 (-0.83)	-0.0588 (-0.11)	0.0477 (0.10)	-0.2635 (-1.06)	-0.1571 (-0.56)	-0.2963 (-1.10)	-0.2950 (-0.97)
<i>Activity * ParIncome</i>	-23.3649 (-1.62)	-13.4439 (-0.75)	-0.3039** (-2.08)	-0.2623* (-1.69)	0.0002* (1.66)	0.0001 (1.20)	0.0831 (0.15)	0.1632 (0.32)	0.1455 (0.80)	0.1343 (0.77)	0.1581 (0.71)	0.1611 (0.73)
<i>Gender</i>	0.3848*** (3.83)	0.5021*** (3.63)	0.2039** (2.52)	0.3374*** (3.80)	0.1652** (2.15)	0.2577*** (2.96)	0.2360** (2.30)	0.3199*** (3.00)	0.3423*** (3.72)	0.4315*** (4.32)	0.3235*** (3.52)	0.4020*** (3.95)
<i>FundSize</i>	-0.0826** (-2.03)	-0.0979** (-2.16)	-0.0032 (-0.11)	-0.0028 (-0.09)	-0.0178 (-0.69)	-0.0141 (-0.47)	0.0170 (0.53)	0.0334 (0.91)	-0.0628* (-1.92)	-0.0622* (-1.79)	-0.0610* (-1.87)	-0.0578* (-1.66)
<i>FundAge</i>	-0.0052 (-1.53)	-0.0046 (-1.27)	0.0010 (0.24)	0.0012 (0.31)	-0.0012 (-0.31)	0.0001 (0.02)	-0.0094* (-1.93)	-0.0087 (-1.65)	-0.0016 (-0.41)	-0.0016 (-0.41)	-0.0010 (-0.27)	-0.0007 (-0.19)
<i>ManagerAge</i>	0.0093 (1.42)	0.0060 (0.63)	0.0008 (0.13)	0.0129 (1.50)	0.0054 (1.05)	0.0156* (1.95)	0.0146** (2.09)	0.0108 (1.27)	0.0040 (0.84)	0.0036 (0.52)	0.0046 (0.92)	0.0050 (0.76)
<i>FirmSize</i>	0.0642 (1.36)	0.0727 (1.45)	-0.0323 (-0.84)	-0.0506 (-1.19)	-0.0321 (-0.87)	-0.0446 (-1.13)	-0.0871** (-2.01)	-0.0998** (-2.23)	0.0267 (0.64)	0.0215 (0.50)	0.0256 (0.62)	0.0199 (0.46)
<i>LogFirmNFunds</i>	-0.0439 (-0.55)	-0.0390 (-0.45)	0.0669 (1.15)	0.1322** (2.04)	0.0755 (1.41)	0.1067** (2.06)	0.1172* (1.91)	0.1587** (2.52)	0.0382 (0.56)	0.0475 (0.67)	0.0339 (0.50)	0.0448 (0.62)
<i>ParYearsEdu</i>	0.0346** (2.12)	0.0288 (1.60)	0.0246 (1.46)	0.0316* (1.86)	0.0225 (1.51)	0.0289* (1.87)	0.0499** (2.32)	0.0489** (2.42)	0.0453** (2.51)	0.0458*** (2.83)	0.0445** (2.45)	0.0440*** (2.76)
<i>HasGraduate</i>	-0.1435 (-1.00)	-0.2321* (-1.80)	-0.1427 (-1.07)	-0.1206 (-1.05)	-0.1227 (-1.03)	-0.1642 (-1.38)	-0.3294* (-1.97)	-0.2993* (-1.80)	-0.1329 (-1.23)	-0.1526 (-1.49)	-0.1407 (-1.28)	-0.1582 (-1.52)
<i>HasMBA</i>	0.1419 (1.34)	0.2015** (1.99)	0.1697 (1.56)	0.2080** (2.26)	0.1039 (1.04)	0.1608 (1.49)	0.2277 (1.58)	0.2456 (1.60)	0.1933** (2.03)	0.2341** (2.54)	0.1897* (1.98)	0.2303** (2.51)
<i>AdmissionRate</i>	0.0933 (0.52)	0.0851 (0.46)	-0.1968 (-1.25)	-0.3465*** (-2.40)	-0.1640 (-1.26)	-0.2037 (-1.50)	-0.2063 (-1.25)	-0.1898 (-1.01)	-0.1981 (-1.58)	-0.1663 (-1.26)	-0.1928 (-1.55)	-0.1690 (-1.30)
<i>FinanceRelated</i>	0.2153*** (2.78)	0.1782** (2.32)	0.1578** (2.12)	0.1587** (2.23)	0.1979*** (2.98)	0.2075*** (3.11)	0.1987* (1.71)	0.1423 (1.34)	0.1968** (2.46)	0.1904** (2.50)	0.2044** (2.61)	0.2110*** (2.86)
<i>Managerial</i>	-0.3717** (-2.47)	-0.3265** (-2.37)	-0.1473 (-1.16)	-0.0864 (-0.85)	-0.2050* (-1.85)	-0.2190** (-2.07)	-0.4006*** (-3.29)	-0.2876** (-2.32)	-0.1452 (-1.33)	-0.1097 (-1.03)	-0.1230 (-1.10)	-0.1025 (-0.96)
Time F.E.	NO	YES	NO	YES	NO	YES	NO	YES	NO	YES	NO	YES
Fund style F.E.	NO	YES	NO	YES	NO	YES	NO	YES	NO	YES	NO	YES
Num. obs.	5,311	5,311	4,651	4,651	6,253	6,253	4,258	4,258	6,119	6,119	6,149	6,149
Adj R-sq	0.0042	0.0154	0.0017	0.0152	0.0043	0.0141	0.0043	0.0149	0.0027	0.0194	0.0026	0.0190

Table 6. Parents' household wealth and performance of fund managers, alpha computed from gross returns

This table shows the results from the regression which is structurally identical to that in Table 3 but with a different left-hand side variable. In this table, *gralpha* (measured in pp) is defined as the four-factor monthly alpha computed from fund gross returns (net returns plus the expense ratio). The exact variable definitions are given in Appendix 3. The inclusion of Morningstar style fixed effects and time (year) fixed effects is indicated at the bottom of the table. T-statistics (reported in parentheses) are based on standard errors clustered at the fund level. * (**, ***) indicates the significance of the coefficient at the 10% (5%, 1%) level.

Independent variables	Dependent variable				Dependent variable				Dependent variable				Dependent variable			
	<i>gralpha</i>	<i>gralpha</i>	<i>gralpha</i>	<i>gralpha</i>	<i>gralpha</i>	<i>gralpha</i>	<i>gralpha</i>	<i>gralpha</i>	<i>gralpha</i>	<i>gralpha</i>	<i>gralpha</i>	<i>gralpha</i>	<i>gralpha</i>	<i>gralpha</i>	<i>gralpha</i>	
	<i>HHWealth: (is proxied for by) FatherIncome</i>				<i>HHWealth: (is proxied for by) ParIncome</i>				<i>HHWealth: (is proxied for by) Rent</i>				<i>HHWealth: (is proxied for by) HomeValue</i>			
<i>HHWealth</i>	-0.0820*** (-3.22)	-0.0691*** (-2.64)	-0.0808*** (-3.38)	-0.0678*** (-2.71)	-0.1272*** (-3.32)	-0.1139*** (-2.99)	-0.1270*** (-3.70)	-0.1109*** (-3.20)	-0.0014* (-1.78)	-0.0016* (-1.88)	-0.0013* (-1.76)	-0.0014* (-1.76)	-0.0111 (-1.13)	-0.0100 (-1.02)	-0.0147 (-1.19)	-0.0097 (-0.72)
<i>Gender</i>	0.2271*** (3.43)	0.2148*** (3.45)	0.2656*** (3.94)	0.2515*** (3.83)	0.2493*** (3.88)	0.2344*** (3.78)	0.2829*** (4.25)	0.2654*** (3.99)	0.1591** (2.21)	0.1298** (2.00)	0.1732** (2.01)	0.1587** (2.00)	-0.0267 (-0.26)	-0.1227 (-1.29)	0.0373 (0.39)	-0.0556 (-0.62)
<i>FundSize</i>	-0.0693*** (-2.81)	-0.0637*** (-2.62)	-0.0709*** (-3.28)	-0.0675*** (-3.00)	-0.0639*** (-2.71)	-0.0578** (-2.54)	-0.0655*** (-3.09)	-0.0615*** (-2.85)	-0.0308 (-1.60)	-0.0231 (-1.25)	-0.0438** (-2.11)	-0.0376* (-1.91)	-0.0983** (-2.58)	-0.0923** (-2.45)	-0.1011** (-2.58)	-0.0932** (-2.42)
<i>FundAge</i>	-0.0040 (-1.56)	-0.0040 (-1.51)	-0.0034 (-1.39)	-0.0031 (-1.22)	-0.0028 (-1.21)	-0.0031 (-1.27)	-0.0023 (-0.98)	-0.0022 (-0.92)	0.0010 (0.29)	0.0010 (0.25)	0.0000 (0.01)	-0.0011 (-0.32)	0.0015 (0.37)	-0.0001 (-0.03)	0.0049 (1.29)	0.0033 (0.86)
<i>ManagerAge</i>	0.0058* (1.74)	0.0019 (0.35)	0.0069** (2.15)	0.0049 (0.91)	0.0055* (1.75)	0.0008 (0.16)	0.0067** (2.19)	0.0037 (0.74)	-0.0029 (-0.73)	-0.0152** (-1.99)	-0.0024 (-0.65)	-0.0147** (-2.08)	0.0036 (0.60)	0.0039 (0.62)	-0.0001 (-0.03)	0.0027 (0.48)
<i>FirmSize</i>	0.0338 (1.13)	0.0314 (1.08)	0.0313 (1.14)	0.0299 (1.06)	0.0209 (0.68)	0.0187 (0.63)	0.0191 (0.68)	0.0179 (0.62)	-0.0037 (-0.15)	-0.0051 (-0.18)	0.0180 (0.63)	0.0163 (0.53)	0.0179 (0.45)	0.0151 (0.42)	0.0197 (0.50)	0.0185 (0.51)
<i>LogFirmNFunds</i>	0.0050 (0.11)	0.0011 (0.02)	0.0106 (0.24)	0.0088 (0.19)	0.0212 (0.45)	0.0161 (0.34)	0.0246 (0.55)	0.0218 (0.46)	0.0382 (0.84)	0.0306 (0.61)	0.0177 (0.37)	0.0145 (0.28)	0.0351 (0.64)	0.0388 (0.84)	0.0404 (0.70)	0.0429 (0.86)
<i>ParYearsEdu</i>	0.0307** (2.51)	0.0280** (2.34)	0.0290** (2.50)	0.0271** (2.28)	0.0294** (2.38)	0.0276** (2.33)	0.0284** (2.44)	0.0271** (2.33)	0.0191* (1.78)	0.0147 (1.45)	0.0125 (1.21)	0.0075 (0.77)	-0.0119 (-0.70)	-0.0144 (-1.00)	0.0044 (0.27)	0.0029 (0.19)
<i>HasGraduate</i>	-0.0723 (-0.97)	-0.0704 (-0.93)	-0.0926 (-1.20)	-0.0787 (-0.99)	-0.1146 (-1.39)	-0.1126 (-1.35)	-0.1344 (-1.60)	-0.1189 (-1.40)	0.0295 (0.34)	0.0034 (0.04)	0.1059 (1.17)	0.0786 (0.85)	-0.0621 (-0.41)	-0.0851 (-0.65)	-0.0279 (-0.17)	-0.0297 (-0.19)
<i>HasMBA</i>	0.0680 (0.94)	0.0554 (0.71)	0.1187 (1.64)	0.0939 (1.21)	0.0955 (1.25)	0.0869 (1.07)	0.1413* (1.78)	0.1188 (1.41)	0.0820 (1.26)	0.0794 (1.09)	0.0624 (0.85)	0.0719 (0.87)	-0.2065 (-1.40)	-0.1816 (-1.33)	-0.1555 (-1.08)	-0.1596 (-1.18)
<i>AdmissionRate</i>	-0.1631* (-1.68)	-0.1165 (-1.12)	-0.1322 (-1.31)	-0.0843 (-0.79)	-0.2364** (-2.24)	-0.1915* (-1.73)	-0.2185** (-2.13)	-0.1669 (-1.53)	-0.2499* (-1.97)	-0.2241* (-1.67)	-0.2301* (-1.82)	-0.2143 (-1.62)	0.1061 (0.72)	0.0608 (0.44)	0.2024 (1.61)	0.1411 (1.10)
<i>FinanceRelated</i>	0.2447*** (3.67)	0.2332*** (3.50)	0.2511*** (3.89)	0.2409*** (3.70)	0.2064*** (3.71)	0.2042*** (3.83)	0.2126*** (3.94)	0.2107*** (4.03)	0.1812*** (3.44)	0.1766*** (3.49)	0.1667*** (2.98)	0.1635*** (3.12)	0.2158** (2.05)	0.2292** (2.28)	0.3027*** (2.84)	0.2913*** (2.93)
<i>Managerial</i>	-0.1065 (-1.32)	-0.1094 (-1.21)	-0.1055 (-1.31)	-0.1182 (-1.42)	-0.1739** (-2.14)	-0.1567* (-1.73)	-0.1690** (-2.13)	-0.1641** (-2.02)	-0.0210 (-0.17)	0.1304 (0.72)	0.1002 (0.70)	0.2397 (1.50)	-0.2166** (-2.03)	-0.2141** (-2.05)	-0.1117 (-1.12)	-0.1302 (-1.34)
Time F.E.	NO	YES	NO	YES	NO	YES	NO	YES	NO	YES	NO	YES	NO	YES	NO	YES
Fund style F.E.	NO	NO	YES	YES	NO	NO	YES	YES	NO	NO	YES	YES	NO	NO	YES	YES
Num. obs.	12,136	12,136	12,136	12,136	12,136	12,136	12,136	12,136	7,292	7,292	7,292	7,292	5,356	5,356	5,356	5,356
Adj R-sq	0.0030	0.0159	0.0030	0.0158	0.0034	0.0163	0.0034	0.0161	0.0023	0.0141	0.0024	0.0141	0.0029	0.0214	0.0028	0.0211

Table 7. Parents' household wealth, managers' Ivy League education, and fund performance

This tables shows the results from the tests that relate the manager's university's Ivy League affiliation to his/her parents' wealth and fund performance. Panel A shows the cross-sectional regression of the *IvyLeague* dummy on the parents' wealth and cross-sectional controls. Panel B shows the regression of funds' four-factor monthly alphas on the *IvyLeague* dummy and controls that include proxies for the median level of students' skill at the educational institution (*ACTMedian*) and the affordability of the educational program (*Tuition*). The exact variable definitions are given in Appendix 3. The inclusion of Morningstar style fixed effects and time (year) fixed effects is indicated at the bottom of the table. T-statistics (reported in parentheses) are based on standard errors clustered at the fund level. * (**, ***) indicates the significance of the coefficient at the 10% (5%, 1%) level.

Panel A. The effect of the parents' household wealth on the probability that the manager would attend an Ivy League university

Indep. variables	Dependent variable			
	<i>IvyLeague</i>	<i>IvyLeague</i>	<i>IvyLeague</i>	<i>IvyLeague</i>
	<i>HHWealth:</i> <i>FatherIncome</i>	<i>HHWealth:</i> <i>ParIncome</i>	<i>HHWealth:</i> <i>Rent</i>	<i>HHWealth:</i> <i>HomeValue</i>
<i>HHWealth</i>	0.1012*** (2.94)	0.1143** (2.12)	0.0039*** (2.99)	-0.0061 (-0.68)
<i>Gender</i>	0.1698 (0.94)	0.1644 (0.89)	0.0984 (0.39)	0.2008 (0.96)
<i>ParYearsEdu</i>	0.0021 (0.15)	0.0089 (0.64)	0.0043 (0.27)	0.0381** (2.25)
<i>FinanceRelated</i>	-0.0106 (-0.10)	0.0453 (0.44)	-0.0044 (-0.04)	0.0546 (0.36)
<i>Managerial</i>	0.0991 (0.78)	0.1516 (1.18)	0.1402 (0.85)	-0.0616 (-0.47)
Num. obs.	84	84	62	45
Adj R-sq	0.1457	0.1026	0.2262	0.0346

Panel B. The effect of the Ivy League education on fund performance

Indep. variables	Dependent variable			
	<i>alpha</i>	<i>alpha</i>	<i>alpha</i>	<i>alpha</i>
<i>IvyLeague</i>	-0.1160* (-1.72)	-0.1163* (-1.71)	-0.1186* (-1.78)	-0.1241* (-1.91)
<i>Gender</i>	0.1882*** (3.44)	0.1761*** (3.33)	0.1896*** (2.92)	0.1842*** (2.92)
<i>FundSize</i>	-0.0481*** (-2.62)	-0.0472*** (-2.71)	-0.0539*** (-2.89)	-0.0541*** (-3.04)
<i>FundAge</i>	0.0019 (0.81)	0.0025 (1.02)	0.0025 (1.02)	0.0033 (1.31)
<i>ManagerAge</i>	-0.0006 (-0.27)	0.0004 (0.13)	-0.0008 (-0.34)	0.0012 (0.36)
<i>FirmSize</i>	0.0493*** (2.62)	0.0441** (2.48)	0.0501** (2.60)	0.0454** (2.49)
<i>LogFirmNFunds</i>	-0.0381 (-1.34)	-0.0272 (-0.97)	-0.0341 (-1.20)	-0.0225 (-0.80)
<i>ACTMedian</i>	0.0083 (0.97)	0.0069 (0.80)	0.0107 (1.29)	0.0094 (1.13)
<i>Tuition</i>	0.0000 (-0.36)	0.0000 (-0.13)	0.0000 (-0.57)	0.0000 (-0.33)
Time F.E.	NO	YES	NO	YES
Fund style F.E.	NO	NO	YES	YES
Num. obs.	14,675	14,675	14,657	14,657
Adj R-sq	0.0009	0.0118	0.001	0.0126